WO2013075948A1 - A method and a system to perform analysis and control when exchanging ciphered data flows - Google Patents

A method and a system to perform analysis and control when exchanging ciphered data flows Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2013075948A1
WO2013075948A1 PCT/EP2012/072074 EP2012072074W WO2013075948A1 WO 2013075948 A1 WO2013075948 A1 WO 2013075948A1 EP 2012072074 W EP2012072074 W EP 2012072074W WO 2013075948 A1 WO2013075948 A1 WO 2013075948A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
ciphered
server
data flows
channel
traffic
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Application number
PCT/EP2012/072074
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Antonio Manuel Amaya Calvo
Juan ROLDÁN PARRA
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Telefonica, S.A.
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Application filed by Telefonica, S.A. filed Critical Telefonica, S.A.
Publication of WO2013075948A1 publication Critical patent/WO2013075948A1/en

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H04L63/166—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the transport layer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/0281—Proxies
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/029—Firewall traversal, e.g. tunnelling or, creating pinholes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0464—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload using hop-by-hop encryption, i.e. wherein an intermediate entity decrypts the information and re-encrypts it before forwarding it
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0471—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload applying encryption by an intermediary, e.g. receiving clear information at the intermediary and encrypting the received information at the intermediary before forwarding

Definitions

  • the present invention generally relates, in a first aspect, to a method to perform analysis and control when exchanging ciphered data flows, said ciphered data flows sent by means of a main ciphered channel between a user and a server, said analysis and control carried out by means of a traffic analyser intercepting ciphered data flows, and more particularly to a method that comprises analyzing only the start of the communication data flow by acting, said traffic analyser, as a temporary end point and performing a hand over of the cipher session parameters to the server side in order to establish said main ciphered channel if said traffic analyser determines that the communication should be allowed.
  • a second aspect of the invention relates to a system arranged to implement the method of the first aspect.
  • DDoS Distributed Denial of Service attacks
  • the traffic analysis can be used just to generate a statistic model of the traffic, or it can be used to forbid or allow the communication to proceed. This way, if the traffic analyzer determines that a given connection is malicious it can drop it before it reaches the server. In this way, the traffic analyzer works as a firewall with dynamic rules.
  • data analyzers can execute a dynamic analysis, as described. But when the data flow is ciphered end-to-end, data analyzers can't intercept the communication; they have to let it proceed, since otherwise the ciphered channel can't be established. Even worse, once the communication has been established the data analyzer can't examine the high level protocol data, since it's ciphered.
  • TLS/SSL which is currently in its revision 1.2, and defined in the IETF RFC 5246. This is the protocol used when ciphering HTTP connection (HTTPS), for example, and is one of the more common network ciphering protocols.
  • the traffic analyzer will act as a proxy. Data will be ciphered between the client and the traffic analyzer, which will decrypt it, analyze it, and if it decides the communication should be allowed, cipher it again (with a different key) and send it ciphered to the server.
  • the present invention provides in a first aspect a method to perform analysis and control when exchanging ciphered data flows, said ciphered data flows sent by means of a main ciphered channel between a user and a server and said analysis and control carried out by means of a traffic analyser intercepting ciphered data flows.
  • the method of the invention in a characteristic manner, comprises:
  • a second aspect of the present invention concerns to a system to perform analysis and control when exchanging ciphered data flows, comprising a server and a user computing device exchanging ciphered data flows by means of a main ciphered channel and a traffic analyser intercepting ciphered data flows to provide said analysis and control.
  • said traffic analyser is configured to implement steps a), b) and c) and said user computing device and said server are configured to perform step d) of the method as described in the first aspect of the invention.
  • Figure 1 shows current systems that generates a model of the normal traffic between a user and a server and try to detect deviations on that model.
  • Figure 2 shows current systems in which data analysers act as terminators for the ciphered data flow acting as a proxy.
  • Figure 3 shows normal ciphered data flow in current systems.
  • Figure 4 shows the ciphered data flow according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the present invention proposes a system and a method based on the development of specific hardware and software residing on the server side to allow the transparent analysis of ciphered traffic. Only the start of the communication data flow will be seen in clear form at the analyzer, and the rest of the traffic will be ciphered end- to-end between a client and a server.
  • the analyser will act as a temporary end-point for the cipher data flow.
  • the server side can then force a renegotiation of the cipher session parameters with the client side.
  • the analyzer won't intervene in this renegotiation, thus allowing the rest of the communication to be ciphered end-to-end
  • SS Secure Server
  • C An endpoint for a ciphered connection, which consumes some kind of service (served by a SS) over a ciphered channel.
  • - Analyser System that acts as a filter for SS, allowing or forbidding connections to be made.
  • the Analyser can take a decision based on the first data packets sent by the client.
  • the Analyser can take external data as part of the decision process.
  • the method and the system of the invention allow the Analyser to examine the first data packages without the client being aware of the Analyser existence, and allow introducing as few changes as possible on existing ciphering protocols.
  • C and SS establish a handshake H(), initiated by C.
  • C sends some (ciphered) data to S.
  • Steps 2 and 3 can be repeated as necessary without repeating step 1 .
  • the invention modifies the normal handshake protocol defined in RFC 5246.
  • the modified procedure used by the invention, to allow X to examine the first exchange, is as follows:
  • C initiates a standard handshake with SS, as defined in the RCC 5246, chapter 7.
  • X intercepts the communication, and answers as it were SS.
  • X generates an on-the-fly identity as SS (X509 certificate), and finishes the standard handshake, creating a ciphered channel (CC1 ).
  • C sends some ciphered data to S. Since CC1 endpoint is X, not SS, X can analyse the data.
  • X sends the data received in step 2 to SS, using CC2. On the same operation, it sets a stop point on SS.
  • the concept of 'stop point' isn't defined in the RFC 5246 standard.
  • a stop point indicates to the TLS layer on the receiving point of a message that the ciphered channel is about to be renegotiated and that the data received must not be passed to the higher level layer until the ciphered channel has been re-established. 5.
  • X sends a 'Repeat Handshake' (HelloRequest in TLS1.2 as defined in section 7.4.1.1 of RFC 5246) message to C, using S address and identity as source.
  • C initiates a new handshake with SS.
  • X doesn't intervene in this connection.
  • a ciphered channel (CC3) is created. Once the channel is re-established, the pending receive operation (from step 4) is finished and the data is passed to the higher layer in the secure server (for example, the data is passed to the web application if the secure server is a web application). The higher layer can then process the data and answer to C.
  • the traffic analyser can be implemented in any network element. As such, it can be included in any element that processes inline IP traffic. For example (not a complete list):
  • GGSN Gateway GPRS Support
  • Node in mobile networks.
  • the traffic analyser can be include in one of the elements listed above via a hardware board specifically built to at least perform the following actions: generating RSA keys for ciphered channels creation, computing Hash algorithms (SHA-1 , SHA- 256 or MD-5) and ciphering data flows with RSA.
  • a hardware board specifically built to at least perform the following actions: generating RSA keys for ciphered channels creation, computing Hash algorithms (SHA-1 , SHA- 256 or MD-5) and ciphering data flows with RSA.
  • the hardware board is provided with an standard interface in order to be installed in said element that processes inline IP traffic.
  • the invention will allow an efficient and dynamic analysis of cipher connections, while preserving the confidentiality of the ciphered data, and the identities of both cipher parties. As such, it will allow the implementation of products like Distributed Denial of Service protectors for services that are offered on encrypted channels.

Abstract

A system and a method to perform efficient analysis and control when exchanging ciphered data flows. In the method of the invention said ciphered data flows are sent by means of a main ciphered channel between a user and a server and there is a traffic analyser intercepting ciphered traffic. It comprises: - establishing a first ciphered channel between said user and said traffic analyser by using cipher session parameters; - analysing, said traffic analyser, at least part of ciphered data flows received via said first ciphered channel in order to determine if communication between said user and said server should be allowed; - performing, said traffic analyser, a hand over of said cipher session parameters between said server and said user if said communication is determined to be allowed; and - establishing said main ciphered channel by at least using said first cipher session parameters. The system of the invention is arranged to implement the method of the invention.

Description

A method and a system to perform analysis and control when exchanging ciphered data flows
Field of the art
The present invention generally relates, in a first aspect, to a method to perform analysis and control when exchanging ciphered data flows, said ciphered data flows sent by means of a main ciphered channel between a user and a server, said analysis and control carried out by means of a traffic analyser intercepting ciphered data flows, and more particularly to a method that comprises analyzing only the start of the communication data flow by acting, said traffic analyser, as a temporary end point and performing a hand over of the cipher session parameters to the server side in order to establish said main ciphered channel if said traffic analyser determines that the communication should be allowed.
A second aspect of the invention relates to a system arranged to implement the method of the first aspect.
Prior State of the Art
There are several situations in which it is necessary to analyse the data traffic passing through a network. One of such situations is, for example, systems that try to proactively detect and defend against Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS).
Those systems try to generate a model of the normal traffic, and try to detect deviations on that model. To that extent, they sometimes analyse the payload of the data packages (high level protocol data). These systems will be shown in Figure 1.
The traffic analysis can be used just to generate a statistic model of the traffic, or it can be used to forbid or allow the communication to proceed. This way, if the traffic analyzer determines that a given connection is malicious it can drop it before it reaches the server. In this way, the traffic analyzer works as a firewall with dynamic rules.
When the data flow is clear text, data analyzers can execute a dynamic analysis, as described. But when the data flow is ciphered end-to-end, data analyzers can't intercept the communication; they have to let it proceed, since otherwise the ciphered channel can't be established. Even worse, once the communication has been established the data analyzer can't examine the high level protocol data, since it's ciphered. One of the most popular protocols used to cipher end-to-end data flows is TLS/SSL, which is currently in its revision 1.2, and defined in the IETF RFC 5246. This is the protocol used when ciphering HTTP connection (HTTPS), for example, and is one of the more common network ciphering protocols.
To solve the analysis problem when using TLS, data analyzers can act as terminators for the ciphered data flow, as it will be shown in Figure 2.
That way, the traffic analyzer will act as a proxy. Data will be ciphered between the client and the traffic analyzer, which will decrypt it, analyze it, and if it decides the communication should be allowed, cipher it again (with a different key) and send it ciphered to the server.
There are other popular ciphering protocols, such as I PSEC, but they're more commonly used in an end-to-network manner, that is, to cipher all traffic between an end point and a given network. Since the manner the protocols are used isn't end-to- end, the analyzer problem is completely different than the one exposed here.
The scheme shown in Figure 2 has several problems:
- Performance: Usually traffic analysers, used to detect attacks, don't need to analyze all the traffic flow. Only the first few packages need to be analyzed to determine if the communication should be allowed to proceed or not. But using the re- ciphering scheme, all the data flow must be decrypted and encrypted again, even when it is not necessary anymore to examine the data. This affects negatively the performance of the traffic analyzer.
- Confidentiality: If the data exchanged between the client and the server is of a sensitive nature -which is probably the main reason to encipher it to start with— then there is a confidentiality problem since all the traffic will be in clear form at the traffic analyser. This might be unacceptable as per the server policies, to the client, or even for legal reasons.
- Client Authentication Handover: If the communication uses cipher-based client authentication (for example, using client certificates) the scheme shown on Figure 2 just doesn't work, since authentication doesn't carry over the re-encryption.
Description of the Invention
It is necessary to offer an alternative to the state of the art which covers the gaps found therein, particularly related to the lack of proposals which allow an efficient and dynamic analysis of cipher connections while preserving the confidentiality of the ciphered data, and the identities of both cipher parties. To that end, the present invention provides in a first aspect a method to perform analysis and control when exchanging ciphered data flows, said ciphered data flows sent by means of a main ciphered channel between a user and a server and said analysis and control carried out by means of a traffic analyser intercepting ciphered data flows.
On contrary to the known proposals, the method of the invention, in a characteristic manner, comprises:
a) establishing, said traffic analyser, a first ciphered channel between said user and said traffic analyser by using cipher session parameters;
b) analysing, said traffic analyser, at least part of ciphered data flows received via said first ciphered channel in order to determine if communication between said user and said server is allowed;
c) performing, said traffic analyser, a hand over of said cipher session parameters between said server and said user if said communication is determined to be allowed and
d) establishing said main ciphered channel by at least using said first cipher session parameters.
Other embodiments of the method of the first aspect of the invention are described according to appended claims 2 to 1 1 , and in a subsequent section related to the detailed description of several embodiments.
A second aspect of the present invention concerns to a system to perform analysis and control when exchanging ciphered data flows, comprising a server and a user computing device exchanging ciphered data flows by means of a main ciphered channel and a traffic analyser intercepting ciphered data flows to provide said analysis and control.
In the system of the second aspect of the invention, on contrary to the known systems mentioned in the prior state of the art section, and in a characteristic manner said traffic analyser is configured to implement steps a), b) and c) and said user computing device and said server are configured to perform step d) of the method as described in the first aspect of the invention.
Other embodiments of the system of the second aspect of the invention are described according to appended claims 13 to 15, and in a subsequent section related to the detailed description of several embodiments. Brief Description of the Drawings The previous and other advantages and features will be more fully understood from the following detailed description of embodiments, with reference to the attached drawings (some of which have already been described in the Prior State of the Art section), which must be considered in an illustrative and non-limiting manner, in which:
Figure 1 shows current systems that generates a model of the normal traffic between a user and a server and try to detect deviations on that model.
Figure 2 shows current systems in which data analysers act as terminators for the ciphered data flow acting as a proxy.
Figure 3 shows normal ciphered data flow in current systems.
Figure 4 shows the ciphered data flow according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description of Several Embodiments
The present invention proposes a system and a method based on the development of specific hardware and software residing on the server side to allow the transparent analysis of ciphered traffic. Only the start of the communication data flow will be seen in clear form at the analyzer, and the rest of the traffic will be ciphered end- to-end between a client and a server.
The scheme will be implemented based on the following broad points:
- The analyser will act as a temporary end-point for the cipher data flow.
- Once the analyser has determined if the communication should be allowed to proceed it will hand over the cipher session parameters to the server side.
- The server side can then force a renegotiation of the cipher session parameters with the client side. The analyzer won't intervene in this renegotiation, thus allowing the rest of the communication to be ciphered end-to-end
The scheme will introduce the minimum necessary change in the TLS1.2 standard (RFC 5246).
The following actors are defined:
- Secure Server (SS): An endpoint for a ciphered connection, which offers some kind of service over a ciphered channel.
- Client (C): An endpoint for a ciphered connection, which consumes some kind of service (served by a SS) over a ciphered channel.
- Analyser (X): System that acts as a filter for SS, allowing or forbidding connections to be made. The Analyser can take a decision based on the first data packets sent by the client. The Analyser can take external data as part of the decision process.
The method and the system of the invention allow the Analyser to examine the first data packages without the client being aware of the Analyser existence, and allow introducing as few changes as possible on existing ciphering protocols.
The normal process to exchange ciphered data is as follows:
1. C and SS establish a handshake H(), initiated by C. As a result, a ciphered channel (CC) is constructed. So it is possible to say that a ciphered channel CC is the result of a handshake operation between the client C and the secure server SS: CC=H(C,SS).
2. Using CC, C sends some (ciphered) data to S.
3. Using CC, S sends some (ciphered) data to C.
Steps 2 and 3 can be repeated as necessary without repeating step 1 .
The invention modifies the normal handshake protocol defined in RFC 5246. The modified procedure used by the invention, to allow X to examine the first exchange, is as follows:
1. C initiates a standard handshake with SS, as defined in the RCC 5246, chapter 7. X intercepts the communication, and answers as it were SS. X generates an on-the-fly identity as SS (X509 certificate), and finishes the standard handshake, creating a ciphered channel (CC1 ).
2. At this point, CC1 =H(C,X), although C believes that CC1 =H(C,SS). Using CC1 , C sends some ciphered data to S. Since CC1 endpoint is X, not SS, X can analyse the data.
3. X analyses the data. Assuming the data is correct and the connection should be allowed to proceed, X establishes a handshake with SS. As source of the handshake, C address is used. This channel will be CC2: CC2=H(C,SS). The handshake procedure is defined in RFC 5246, chapter 7. Since C doesn't have an identity (digital certificate), and X is placed inline on the data flow, SS believes that the connection comes from C.
4. X sends the data received in step 2 to SS, using CC2. On the same operation, it sets a stop point on SS. The concept of 'stop point' isn't defined in the RFC 5246 standard. A stop point, indicates to the TLS layer on the receiving point of a message that the ciphered channel is about to be renegotiated and that the data received must not be passed to the higher level layer until the ciphered channel has been re-established. 5. X sends a 'Repeat Handshake' (HelloRequest in TLS1.2 as defined in section 7.4.1.1 of RFC 5246) message to C, using S address and identity as source.
6. C initiates a new handshake with SS. X doesn't intervene in this connection. A ciphered channel (CC3) is created. Once the channel is re-established, the pending receive operation (from step 4) is finished and the data is passed to the higher layer in the secure server (for example, the data is passed to the web application if the secure server is a web application). The higher layer can then process the data and answer to C.
7. Using CC3, S sends some (ciphered) data to C. This data isn't intercepted or analysed in any way by the Traffic Analyser (X).
The traffic analyser can be implemented in any network element. As such, it can be included in any element that processes inline IP traffic. For example (not a complete list):
- ISP Network routers.
- SGSN (Serving GPRS Support Node) or GGSN (Gateway GPRS Support
Node) in mobile networks.
- Cable/ADSL routers
- ONTs
The traffic analyser can be include in one of the elements listed above via a hardware board specifically built to at least perform the following actions: generating RSA keys for ciphered channels creation, computing Hash algorithms (SHA-1 , SHA- 256 or MD-5) and ciphering data flows with RSA.
The hardware board is provided with an standard interface in order to be installed in said element that processes inline IP traffic.
The invention will allow an efficient and dynamic analysis of cipher connections, while preserving the confidentiality of the ciphered data, and the identities of both cipher parties. As such, it will allow the implementation of products like Distributed Denial of Service protectors for services that are offered on encrypted channels.
A person skilled in the art could introduce changes and modifications in the embodiments described without departing from the scope of the invention as it is defined in the attached claims. ACRONYMS
ADSL Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
IP Internet Protocol
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System

Claims

Claims
'\ - A method to perform analysis and control when exchanging ciphered data flows, said ciphered data flows sent by means of a main ciphered channel between a user and a server, said analysis and control carried out by means of a traffic analyser intercepting ciphered data flows, characterised in that it comprises:
a) establishing, said traffic analyser, a first ciphered channel between said user and said traffic analyser by using cipher session parameters;
b) analysing, said traffic analyser, at least part of ciphered data flows received via said first ciphered channel in order to determine if communication between said user and said server should be allowed;
c) performing, said traffic analyser, a hand over of said cipher session parameters between said server and said user if said communication is determined to be allowed; and
d) establishing said main ciphered channel by at least using said first cipher session parameters.
2.- A method as per claim 1 , further comprising using external data when performing said step b) in order to determine if said communication between said user and said server should be allowed.
3.- A method as per claim 1 or 2, comprising performing said exchange of ciphered data flows between said user and said server without the intervention of said traffic analyser once that said main ciphered channel has been established.
4. - A method as per claim 1 , 2 or 3 comprising initiating, said user, a first handshake with said server, said first handshake being answered by said traffic analyser as it were said server by generating, said traffic analyser, an identity as said server in order to create said first ciphered channel.
5. - A method as per claim 4, comprising analysing ciphered data flows sent from said user to said server but received by said traffic analyser by means of said first ciphered channel and performing a second handshake between said traffic analyser and said server if said ciphered data flows are correct according to said analysis, said second handshake having as source the address of said user, in order to create a second ciphered channel.
6. - A method as per claim 5, comprising sending, said data analyser, said ciphered data flows received by means of said first ciphered channel and a stop indicator to said server via said second ciphered channel, wherein said stop indicator indicates to said server that a renegotiation of said second channel must be performed and that said ciphered data flows must not be passed to a higher level layer until said second ciphered channel has been re-established.
7. - A method as per claim 6, comprising sending, said data analyser, a repeat handshake message to said user using the address of said server as source when said stop indicator has been sent to said server.
8. - A method as per claim 7, comprising performing, said user, a third handshake with said server when receiving said repeat handshake message in order to create said main ciphered channel between said user and said server without the intervention of said traffic analyser.
9. - A method as per claim 8, comprising passing to said higher layer said ciphered data flows sent to said server via said second ciphered channel when said main ciphered channel has been established.
10. - A method as per claim 9, comprising performing said first, second and third handshakes according to protocol defined in RFC 5246, generating said identity according to a X.509 certificate of ITU-T standard and/or generating said repeat handshake message according to a HelloRequest of protocol defined in RFC 5246.
1 1 . - A method as per any of previous claims, wherein said traffic analyser is included in an element that processes inline IP traffic, said element being one of the following non closed list: ISP network routers, Serving GPRS Support Nodes, Gateway GPRS Support Nodes, cable routers, ADSL routers and Optical Network Terminations.
12. - A system to perform analysis and control when exchanging ciphered data flows, comprising a server and a user computing device exchanging ciphered data flows by means of a main ciphered channel and a traffic analyser intercepting ciphered data flows to provide said analysis and control, characterised in that said traffic analyser is configured to implement steps a), b) and c) and said user computing device and said server are configured to perform step d) of the method as per any of previous claims 1 to 1 1.
13. - A system as per claim 12, wherein said traffic analyser is included in an element that processes inline IP traffic via a hardware board specifically built to at least perform the following actions: generating keys for ciphered channels creation, computing Hash algorithms and ciphering data flows.
14. - A system as per claim 13, wherein said key generation and said ciphering of data flows are performed according to RSA protocol and said Hash algorithms are SHA-1 , SHA-256 or MD-5.
15.- A system as per claim 13 or 14, wherein said hardware board is provided with an standard interface in order to be installed in said element that processes inline IP traffic, said element being one of the following non closed list: ISP network routers, Serving GPRS Support Nodes, Gateway GPRS Support Nodes, cable routers, ADSL routers and Optical Network Terminations.
PCT/EP2012/072074 2011-11-23 2012-11-07 A method and a system to perform analysis and control when exchanging ciphered data flows WO2013075948A1 (en)

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ES201131889A ES2410681B1 (en) 2011-11-23 2011-11-23 METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR PERFORMING ANALYSIS AND CONTROL WHEN EXCHANGED FLOWS OF ENCRYPTED DATA
ESP201131889 2011-11-23

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