WO2009038446A1

WO2009038446A1 - A portable secure identity and mass storage unit

Info

Publication number: WO2009038446A1
Application number: PCT/MY2007/000063
Authority: WO
Inventors: Kong Pheng Lee; Arendt Henning
Original assignee: Advanced Product Design Sdn. Bhd.
Priority date: 2007-09-20
Filing date: 2007-09-20
Publication date: 2009-03-26

Abstract

This invention relates to a portable secure identity and mass storage device comprises an identity processing unit, a cryptographic processing unit and a mass storage unit. The identity processing unit in this invention authenticates the owner of the device. The identity processing unit can be a biometrics processing unit, a radio frequency identity reader (RPID) or a wireless smart card reader. The identity processing unit retrieves the identification signal, external to the device, performs signal processing, authenticates the signal retrieved against identity parameters stored within the device independent from a PC Host . The cryptographic processing unit is used to read a smart card which enables seamless integration into Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) ar- chitecruresand stores users' personal certificate credentials, such as private keys, passwords and digital certificate. Unlike other smart card systems which are accessed by entering a Personal Identification Number(PIN) in the personal computer; the identity processing unit is used to enable secure access to the smart card, once authenticated, by releasing the PIN without going through a PC. The PIN number is securely embedded within the device and cannot be accessed by any PC. In addition, the cryptographic processor can generate one time passwords and enable the security token by an authenticated identity entry. The access to the mass storage device is also protected by the identity authentication. The data stored within the device is encrypted.The encryption keys are stored within the device. The encryption key is generated in the mass storage processor from two encryption keys that are physical stored in two separate integrated circuits.

Description

Description A PORTABLE SECURE IDENTITY AND MASS STORAGE

UNIT Description of the Art The device described in current invention comprises of a cryptographic processing unit, a USB mass storage unit and an identity processing unit. The cryptographic processing unit which has a built in non-volatile memory also interfaces an external non-volatile memory and a smart card. The cryptographic processing unit can also function as a smart card reader. A smart card typically contains non-volatile memory and microprocessor components with various tamper-resistant properties and is capable of providing security services. Smart cards have been advertised as suitable for personal identification tasks, because they are engineered to be tamper resistant. The embedded chip of a smart card usually implements some cryptographic algorithm. Information about the inner workings of this algorithm can be obtained if the precise time and electrical current required for certain encryption or decryption operations is measured.

The smart cards are commonly used in both, financial and identification sectors. In the financial sector, the smart cards are commonly used as credit and ATM cards. Smart cards may also be used as electronic wallets . The smart card chip can be loaded with funds which can be spent in parking meters, vending machines or at various merchants. Cryptographic protocols protect the exchange of money between the smart card and an accepting machine.

In the identification sector, smart cards are used for authentication of identity. The most common example is in conjunction with a PKI. The smart card will store personal keys and so called encrypted digital certificates, issued from the PKI, along with other relevant or needed information about the card holder. Examples include the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) Common Access Card (CAC), and the use of various smart cards by many governments as identification cards for their citizens. Smart cards are a privacy-enhancing technology, as the person carries and controls it's personal information all the time.

Alternately, the cryptographic processor of the cryptographic processing unit of this present invention, which has both external and built-in non-volatile memory, can function as a combination of a smart card reader .and smart card on board. That allows the cryptographic processor to generate encrypted digital personal keys. The cryptographic processor communicates with a PC host via the mass storage processor by encrypted embedded commands. Both, PC host and the cryptographic processor, must have the same encryption key for communication. In addition, an exchange of private authentication keys has to take place between the cryptographic processor and PC Host prior to any command or data communication. The cryp- tographic processor will stop functioning if it receives any invalid command from PC host. Any invalid command or any hidden hacking activities from a PC will be recorded in the cryptographic processor built-in non-volatile memory for future retrieval. The device has then to be unplugged from the USB port in order to reset the cryptographic processor.

In addition, the cryptographic processor which incorporates hardware multiplier and divider is able to process cryptographic algorithms. Examples are provided below:

The identity processing unit comprises an identity processor and identity scanner.

In the context of RFlD and wireless smart card, the identity scanner is an antenna. In the case of biometrics identity, the identity scanner is a biometric sensor.

An identity processor is an integrated circuit for storing and processing information, modulating and demodulating a Radio Frequency or biometrics information. The identity information which includes, but is not limited to, RFID, wireless smart card and biometrics information has to be enrolled prior to the use of the device. The identity parameter generated is then stored within the device for later authentication. The device in the current invention is capable to store (up to 10 or more) different identity parameters securely. The mass storage unit consists of a mass storage processor and a plurality of mass storage media. The mass storage processor is tagged with a unique serial number as part of Universal Serial Bus information. The mass storage processor of the present invention includes an on-thc-fly hardware encryption/decryption unit which encrypts mass storage data prior to storing and decrypts mass storage data after retrieving it from a mass storage unit. The mass storage unit will appear to be as a removable disk to a PC host. Mass storage is referred to as storage of large amounts of information. Storage media for mass storage includes, but is not limited to, hard disks and flash memory. In the present invention, NAND flash memory is used.

In prior art design methodology, as in Figure 3, a USB HUB 06 is required to integrate a cryptographic processing unit, a mass storage unit and an identity processing unit. Inter-module data and command communication has to be done via connected PC host and not within the device. This implementation is not very secure as sensitive information is communicated and processed outside of the device. In addition, an implementation using of a USB2.0 HUB will consume a lot of current and generate a significant amount of heat. This will affect the quality and usability of the device.

One objective of the current invention is a new innovative way which removes the use of a USB HUB in order to reduce current consumption and to allow secure communication among the cryptographic processing unit, mass storage processing unit and identity processing unit within the device. In the current invention, an innovative scheme is implemented. That is, only the USB mass storage processor is connected to a USB2.0 bus to a PC host. Communication for both, cryptographic processing unit and identity processing unit to and from PC host, are solely performed via encrypted embedded commands transported within the mass storage processor. Such commu- nication channels are supported by USB Human Interface Device Class and USB Mass Storage Device class commands.

Another objective of current invention is to have the encrypted embedded commands supported by the above communication channels so that PC can send and receive command and data to and from the cryptographic processing unit and the identity processing unit. In addition, firmware of both, cryptographic processing unit and the identity processing unit, can be upgraded from a host PC.

Another objective of current invention is to integrate digital certificates (of the smart card) to identity features of a user. The Smart Card is enabled by a PlN input. The PIN is bonded to the identity parameter of a specific user. Both, PlN and identity parameters, are securely stored within the device. The PlN is released to the smart card reader only with the proper authentication of the stored identity parameters of the user. To enhance higher security, secure data from the smart card may be only accessed when 2 or more identity parameters are presented.

Prior art devices use PlN numbers to access a smart card. PIN numbers are entered via a personal computer and transmitted via computer serial ports such as RS232 or USB to the smart card reader in order to enable the smart card. This allows a hacker to use known attacks like a keystroke logger to retrieve PIN numbers.Tbis makes lhc smart card access insecure.

However, the device, described in the current invention, securely stores the PIN number within the device. The PlN number is released to the smart card reader only after authentication of a valid identity. The PIN number is stored in the device in 2 different ways. One is during the initialization process of a smart card: the device generates a random PJN for the smart card. The PIN is then stored within the device. In another scenario, a smart card comes with a PIN number. The user can either enter this PIN via a driver utility of the device at a host PC or by entering the PIN number through a tactile switch of the device. The device driver utility allows the new PIN number to be entered only after both are authenticated, the device and the user. The user needs a special password to enter the new PIN. The PIN number cannot be read out from the device and therefore it is far more secure than current implementations: the PIN is not displayed or subjected to be stolen by any keystroke logger.

Another objective of the current invention is that one time passwords, electronic tokens and other cryptographic functions can be associated with an enrolled user identity. Such cryptographic algorithm data is released to the host PC via the secure embedded communication channels only after an enrolled user identity is authenticated.

Another objective of the current invention for the device is to function as a multi- factor authentication for secure transactions. The USB processing unit has a serial number as part of USB information; the encrypted embedded commands include an encryption key; an authentication key has to be exchanged between the cryptographic processor and the host PC prior to the start of any encrypted embedded command communication; a digital certificate, a one-time password or a security token are released by one or multiple authenticated identity parameters.

Another objective of the current invention is to eliminate a user from remembering the PIN number and PASSWORD. Users tend to forget PINsand PASSWORDS. They arc having even more problems of resetting PASSWORDS and PINs

The device in the current invention is able to offer multiple PlNs for multiple smart cards or multiple PlNs for a single smart card. Therefore the device is flexible enough Io be used for multiple smart cards. The device is built-in with a write only PlN bank. This PIN bank will store a limited number of PINs for various smart cards used within the device. In the current invention, the PlN bank is limited to 16 PINs and the user can select which PIN to be used with the inserted smart card. The driver utility software can be used to activate the desired PlN to be used.

The device in the current invention can also be configured in such a way that different identity parameters can be associated with different PINs. Such associations arc possible after all identities are enrolled in the device. In this case the driver utility software will be used to configure different PINs to be associated with different identities.

The device in the current invention includes an on the fly hardware encryption/decryption unit within the mass storage processor. The encryption keys are physically stored encrypted within the storage area of 2 different integrated circuits. The encryption/decryption engine which is on a third integrated circuit rcadstwoseparately stored encrypted encryption keys, integrates the two keys into one, and then uses the final key for encryption/decryption of the data. This implementation will make the hardware hacking almost impossible. In addition, the mass storage area is further secured by special cpoxy. This epoxy will prevent the mass storage 1C to be removed without being damaged in caseof an attempted removal. Another objective of the current invention is to provide an encryption key alteration mechanism. That allows for modifying the encryption/decryption key for the mass storage unit. Once the key is modified, the mass storage unit has to be formatted by the PC operation systems in order to be used again. In the present invention, the encryption/decryption key, stored within the cryptographic processor, can be triggered to generate a new random key by the PC utility software when none of the identity parameter is enrolled.

The present invention will be understood more clearly with the accompanying drawings:

Figure 1 shows the device TOP view. Figure 2 shows the bottom view of the device.

Figure 3 shows the device functional block based on prior art design methodology. Figure 4 shows the device functional block diagram. Figure 5 shows the typical device operation flowchart. Figure 6 shows an example of device operating flowchart. Figure 7 show an example of the PlN Bank.

Figure 8 shows an example of embedded cryptographic commands enabled by two identity parameters. Figure 1 shows the top view of the device 10 of the current invention. The device 10 may be connected to the host PC via a communication interface connector 14. In the current invention, a USB plug is being used. The "communication interface connector 14 provides reliable communication connection of the device to host PC and supplies the current to the device for operation. In the drawing, the biomelric scanner 12 appears on the top surface of the device in order to allow the user easy input of the biomctric parameters. In the case of a radio frequency antenna, it will be embedded inside the housing without being visible appear externally.. The LED indicator 08 is used to display the current status of the device. This includes prompting the user to enter biomelric parameters via the biometric scanner 12, calling for a wireless signal from an' RFlD transponder or wireless smart card, displaying the PIN entry of the smart card, displaying the read and write status of the mass storage data, displaying the enrolment status of the biometric parameters, etc. The tactile switch 18 is used for various functional operations of the device. This includes resetting of enrolled identities, entry of the PlN numbers, etc. Figure 2 shows the bottom view of the device. The smart card cover 16 is used to allow a user to access the smart card. The smart card cover 16 can be removed so that a user can insert or remove a smart card. The smart card cover can be sealed permanently in case the user would like to have the smart card permanently attached to the device or have the smart card function built into the cryptographic processor. In this case, the device will not have any smart card connector installed.

Refer to figure 4 of the device in current invention. It consists of a mass storage processor 20 which includes a hardware encryption/decryption engine, a mass storage media unit 22, a USB Plug 14, a tactile switch 18, a LED indicator 08, a cryptographic processor 30, a smart card connector 32, a non-volatile memory 34, an identity processor 40 and an identity scanner 42. The mass storage media unit 22 is a plurality of non-volatile solid state read/write memory.

The mass storage processor 20 interfaces to a host PC by a computer serial bus such as USB. It is connected to the mass storage media unit 22 and the cryptographic processor 30 within the device. The cryptographic processor 30 is connected to a smart card connector 32, a tactile switch 18, a LED indicator 08, a noπ- volatile memory 34 and the identity processor 40.

The mass storage processor 20 decodes all the PC commands and performs the read/write commands to mass storage processor 20 via it's built in hardware encryption/decryption engine. In addition, it also transports the encrypted embedded commands to and from the cryptographic processor 30 for the host PC. The cryptographic processor 30 decodes the encrypted embedded commands from a host PC. The decrypted identity embedded commands are sent to the identity processor 40. The cryptographic processor 30 processes the decrypted cryptographic embedded commands accordingly. As the cryptographic processing unit is connected directly to the identity processing unit, all cryptographic functions arc securely and closely integrated with the identity functions.

The use of encrypted embedded commands between a host PC and the mass storage processing units eliminates the use of any USB hub to integrate the mass storage processor 20, the identity processing unit and the cryptographic processing unit. This represents a huge saving of power consumption, PCB layout space and cost ; all host communication control of the device is performed by the mass storage processing unit 20. The modules arc securely integrated and all identity cryptographic functions are performed within the device only.

One of the objectives of the tactile switch 18 is to be used to enter commands to the cryptographic processor 30. In the present invention, the device is set in identity re- enrolment mode when the tactile switch 18 is pressed while the dcviccis plugged into the LJSB port. After the device is authenticated against the stored identity parameter, it will erase all stored identity parameters and set the device into re-enrol mode.

In a normal mode, commands to the cryptographic processor 30 can be activated by asserting the tactile switch 18 continuously for 3 seconds. The command entry is then set to the first digit and the value of the digit is set to ¹O'. The LED 08 will display according to subsequent assertions. In the device of the present invention, an assertion of less than 1 second means to increment the current digit by one. An assertion of more than one second but less than 3 seconds means completion of current digit entry and the start of next digit entry and sets the next digit value to ¹O'. The user has to assert the tactile switch 18 for more than 3 seconds in order to complete the entry of a code. This allows secure entries of configuration data, PINs, etc. without the need of using the device driver utilityor any host PC activity.

■ A typical sequence of operation of the device is best described in Figure 5. When the device in according to the present invention is connected to host PC via connector 14 [STEP 50], the device will power up and initialize [STEP 52]. During the initialization process, the cryptographic processor 30 will check if the tactile switch 18 is asserted. Thereafter, the cryptographic processor 30 will be checking if any identity parameter is enrolled into the device [STEP 54]. If the device had not been enrolled with any identity parameter, the cryptographic processor 30 will check if the communication between PC host can be established. If the factory configuration data allows communication between PC host and the device to be established when there is no identity parameter , the device of the present invention can then be accessed by the driver utility software from the host PC for identity enrolment [STEP 56]. The driver utility software on the host PC provides the following functionality:

1. user identity enrolment and authentication training during the initial use of the device

2. a tool for identity enrolment. The user is guided through the enrolment process by using a PC graphics user interface

3. entry of PINs for the smart card. A smart card PIN cannot be read but it can be modified.

4. tagging of smart card PINs to enrolled identity parameters

5. tagging of PC passwords to enrolled identity parameters

6. tagging of cryptographic functions such as one time passwords and electronic tokens to enrolled identity parameters. 7. as an security option, it can be used to set that both the identity processor 40 and the cryptographic processor unit 30 are no longer allowed to be accessed by the driver utility software and the encrypted embedded communication channel is permanently disabled. Alternately, the configuration data can be set at the factory level. As an example, the device can be set to prevent any communication with the host until all identity parameters are enrolled after it is first plugged-in, . In this case, the user has to enrol the identity [STEP 56] without the assistant of the driver utility software but guided by LED 08 and can be controlled by tactile switch. In this way, the device is completely self contained without allowing any access from any host PC. Once all the identity parameters are enrolled, the mass storage processor 20 will retrieve the first and the second encrypted encryption key from mass storage media unit 22 and cryptographic processor 30, respectively. The final encryption/decryption key is then generated via a proprietary computation method from the two encryption keys [STEP 66]. Once the device has been enrolled [STEP 54], a user has to be authenticated. The

LED 08 will prompt the user to present his/her identity in the form of biometrics, RFlD or wireless smart card [STEP 58] to the device. The retrieved identity is then authenticated against the stored identity parameters [STEP 60]. In the device of the present invention, the user is allowed to have a predefined maximum (of 3) authen- tication attempts within 60 seconds from the time the device is plugged in. The device will be shut down if the predefined number of attempts failed or more than 60 seconds have expired.

Once a user is authenticated, the cryptographic processor will check if any identity rc-cnrolmcnt request [STEP 62] is made. In the present invention, the identity rc- enrolment request is made when tactile switch 18 is asserted during device initialization [STEP 52]. If the rc-cπrolment request is made, then the current identity parameters arc erased [STEP 64] and the device will proceed to identity enrolment [STEP 56]. After identity enrolment is completed [STEP 56], the encryption key is generated [STEP 66] and the enumeration of communication channel with the PC host will be started [STEP 68]. The device will appear in a host PC as a removable disk. In the device of the current invention, a vendor specific SCSI (Small Computer System Interface) command is used to provide a communication channel between the host PC and the cryptographic processor 30. The mass storage, cryptographic and identity function can then be accessed by the PC host. Access by the host PC to the cryptographic processor 30 and identity processor 40 is supported by the encrypted embedded commands. The cryptographic processing unit will recognize the encrypted embedded commands of the same encryption key. In addition, a valid authentication code has to be sent from the host PC to the cryptographic processor 30 in order to start the communication process. In the device of the present invention, the cryptographic processing unit allows up to two host PC attempts of sending a valid authentication code. The device will check continuously for any mass storage processing command

[STEP 70], embedded cryptographic command [STEP 74] or embedded identity command [STEP 92].

If the embedded cryptographic command is received [STEP 92], the cryptographic processing unit will check if the host PC is asking for a password [STEP 82]. If this is the case, the user identity is authenticated [STEP 84 & STEP 86] prior to the password associated with the identity parameter before it is released to the host PC [STEP 88] from the identity processing unit. Otherwise, the identity processing unit will process the identity command accordingly [STEP 90]. Should the command require authentication of a user, then LED 08 will blink to prompt the user to enter his/her identity. If the command is meant for the mass storage unit, the mass storage will process the command and data accordingly. This includes decrypting of mass storage data from the media storage unit 22 before sending it to the host PC and encrypting of any mass storage data before writing into the mass storage media unit 22 [STEP 72]. If the embedded cryptographic command is received [STEP 74], typically a user identity needs to be authenticated [STEP 76 & STEP 78] before a PIN is entered into a smart card or the identity PIN is used to enable a cryptographic algorithm [STEP 80]. This includes, but is not limited to, releasing of digital certificates or keys, security tokens, or one time passwords. Alternately, for a specific cryptographic function, the user may be asked to authenticate against 2 or more different identity parameters prior to enabling the cryptographic function.

Figure 6 shows an example of identity parameters tagged with PIN and Password. PINs are associated with smartcards and other cryptographic functions and passwords are associated with PC application. Both, the PlN bank and password bank in the device of the present invention are stored within the non-volatile memory of the identity processor 40. However, it can also be stored within the non-volatile memory of cryptographic processor 30 and the external non-volatile memory 34. Alternately, it can also be stored in the removable smart card.

Figure 7 shows an example of a PIN bank. An example of the device of the present invention allows up to 16 PlNs and 16 passwords to be stored. Each identity parameter enrolled can be tagged with a PIN and a password. Each PIN and each password can be of any number of digits- it is up to 16-digits in length in the example of the present invention. In addition, the descriptor to each PIN or password can be up to 32 characters.

Figure 8 shows an example of an embedded cryptographic command enabled by two identity parameters. IDl and ID2 indicate the identity parameters to be authenticated before the embedded cryptographic command will be processed. CRC is a type of hash function used to produce a checksum, in order to detect errors in command or data transmission.

It is common general knowledge that with the advancement of semiconductor and firmware technology, combinations of the above processing units to one or two physical units is possible, including all, rriass storage processor 20, cryptographic processor 30 and identity processor 40.

While the present invention is described by means of specific embodiments, it will be understood that modifications may be made without departing from the spirit of the invention. The scope of the invention is not to be considered as limited by the description of the invention set forth in this description, but rather defined by the following claims:

Claims

1 . A portable secure identity and mass storage device without built-in USB HUB comprises: a cryptographic processing unit which is able to perform intensive decrypting/encrypting of commands, data and to process cryptographic algorithms a mass storage processing unit which includes a hardware on-thc-fly encryption and decryption engine for mass storage data an identity processing unit which performs enrollment of identity parameters, stores them securely and authenticates against these enrolled identity parameters a plurality of mass storage media for storing of mass storage encryption data an internal cpmmumcation channel linking the cryptographic processing unit, the mass storage unit and the identity processing unit

2 . The authorization access to mass storage unit, cryptographic unit and identity unit of the portable secure identity and mass storage device of claim 1 is only possible after an enrolled identity of the device is positively authenticated

3 . The encryption key of the on-the-fly hardware encryption/decryption unit within the mass storage processor of the device of claim 1 is generated from two different encryption keys. These encryption keys are physical stored within the storage area of two different integrated circuits. The encryption/decryption engine which is in the third integrated circuit reads the two encryption keys, integrates the two keys into one, and uses the final resulting key for encryption/decryption of mass storage data.

4 . The encryption/decryption key of claim 4 can be altered through an encryption/ decryption key alteration scheme

5 . The cryptographic processor of the device of claim 1 is accessible from a host PC by using encrypted embedded commands and data. The cryptographic processor decrypts the incoming commands and data with its own encryption key. The cryptographic processor encrypts the commands and data before it sends it to the host PC.

6 . The identity processing unit of the device of claim 1 is accessible by a host PC only using the encrypted embedded commands of claim 5.

7 . Both, the firmware of the identity processing unit and the cryptographic processing unit of claim 1 , can be upgraded by the encrypted embedded commands of claim 5.

8 . The identity processing unit of the device of claim 1 has two identity enrolment schemes. One identity enrolment scheme is by using the device driver utility supported via encrypted embedded commands.Thc other one is integrated into the device, without need of any host PCsupport functions.

9 . The identity processing unit of the device of claim 1 allows enrolment of several(at least up to 10) identities. These identities can be either biomctric fingerprints, RFlD or wireless smart cards.

10 . Each enrolled identity of claim 7 can be associated with a PIN and a password. A password may be released to a host PC for various password protected application. One or more PlNs are released internally to enable the cryptographic functions.

1 1 . To allow for very secure operations, both, the identity unit and the cryptographic processor of the device of claim 1 ,can be set as an option to operate completely self contained without allowing any access from any host PC as proposed in claims 5, 6 and 7.

12 . The optional security setting of claim 11 which allows no further access to both.the identity unit andthe cryptographic processor can be set, after the unit of claim 1 is dedicated to a user.

13 . One version of the unit of claim 1 can be completely self contained without any access from a host PC to both, the identity unit and the cryptographic processor. This version is controlled by tactile switches and a display for user guidance.