WO2001030044A2 - Method and apparatus for creation of secure communications channel, identification and payment - Google Patents
Method and apparatus for creation of secure communications channel, identification and payment Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2001030044A2 WO2001030044A2 PCT/BG2000/000026 BG0000026W WO0130044A2 WO 2001030044 A2 WO2001030044 A2 WO 2001030044A2 BG 0000026 W BG0000026 W BG 0000026W WO 0130044 A2 WO0130044 A2 WO 0130044A2
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- password
- information
- secure
- channel
- block
- Prior art date
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Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0485—Networking architectures for enhanced packet encryption processing, e.g. offloading of IPsec packet processing or efficient security association look-up
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
- H04L2463/102—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying security measure for e-commerce
Definitions
- This invention is relative to information ciphering, user identification, certi ication o-f documents, e—banking, electronic apparatuses for payment, transmitting of confidential information through public channels and access control systems.
- the secure communication channels are generaly used in the corporative networks. They are built on base of various secure protocols. Each secure protocol uses some kind of information ciphering for sender and deciphering for the recipient. It is possible on condition that in the two end points of the channel is available a list of previously specified passwords for communication.
- An example for communication through a secure channel is the connection between a bank automate and the bank.
- This example shows in addition an important application of the secure channels, namely the remote client identification.
- the client in this case identifies thyself using a card for payment and its own personal identification code. If it is excluded the possibility to use illegaly the specified password list, the secure channel identifies the associated persons.
- the realization of secure channel is made using the app scheme — sender ciphering and recipient deciphering.
- the difference is that the list of communication passwords together with the ciphering/deciphering mechanism are in an undisassemble device. In this device can be added password lists, but never can be read internal password. In this way at communication time the device identifies itself and the user identifies thyself using a personal password.
- the info ation packadge is consecutively ciphered with internal communication password and a personal password. It is provided to be there a possibility for an ⁇ nimous communications through a secure channel, ciphering the information only by an internal password. There is in addition a possibility for secure communication through a separate channel. In this case is used ciphering by an internal password for the separate channel , an internal password of a center that certifies the identity and a personal password. The center for identity certification identifies the user using his personal password and the internal password for communica ions with the center, if the packadge deciphering is successfull. After this the center ciphers the packadge using the communication password for the other user and his personal password and sends it to him. The packadge itself is ciphered through all time with the password for separate channel. At the end it is deciphered by the recipient. In this way the information security is guaranteed and the center certifies the identity of corresponding persons.
- Each session through the secure channel is made unical by transmitting a random marker in the ciphered part of the packadge and expecting to return the same marker to the sender in the ciphered message of the recipient.
- the internal password identifies the device if there is not any way to access it and it only gives the after—efect on the ciphered result. Because of this the ciphering/deciphering method must be appropiated to multiusing of one and the same password, as well as to the fact that allways is ciphered known information. Must be made impossible the attempts to discover the internal password using statistics and inputting test information for ciphering, as a block filled in by one and the same symbol, for example.
- the method for ciphering can cope with statistics risk including delution of information with random noise. It can cope with the risk of the test information for ciphering using a method for diversification of ciphered block contents. This method is applied when the block contains minor than defined number of different symbols. In this way the internal passwords are logically protected.
- the physical device that proceeds the method is undisassemble, but regardless of this all passwords are kept ciphered by the personal password.
- the personal password is kept marked by a label in a random place of a noise file, ciphered by the same personal password. Even so there is a possibility for physical access to internal memory, nobody can use contained there information without the personal password.
- the special computer has nonvolative memory, main memory, procesor, bus menagement unit, clock pulse generator, noise generator (for random numbers), buffered input/output, lock-up system in case of physical destruction.
- the lock—up system in case of physical destruction is of the base importance for the method. It guarantees that the device is undisassemble.
- the computer is managed by a previously installed software that executes the commands for input/output, for ciphering/deciphering and block forming according to the established protocol.
- the software is installed at device producing time and can not be changed nor yet can be read outside when the device is in use.
- Nonvolative memory can only be deleted.
- the files can be deleted when a valid password for the respective file is inputted. For some files it is the personal password, for other files the user does not know the password for deleting. Of this kind for example is the file for device and user identification.
- a file of such kind can be deleted from that, who was created it, he knows the respective password.
- the password file was deleted is impossible direct connection through secure channel with the respective person.
- the computer has some modes that are managed from the user:
- Undelible record prohibited mode prohibits undelible record in the internal nonvolative memory. Ordinary the undelible record is prohibited.
- the computer is powered by the device with that is connected through a special coupling.
- the undisassemble device has not independent value. It allways is used together with another computer, playing the role of user server.
- the user server can be of any kind computer, portable or in ovable with communication possibilities. It is possible to create a special portable user server with built in possibilities for mobile connections or for pseudomobile connection through infrared or radio connection with a fixed device, that establishes a connection with a communication center.
- the cash machines, public telephones and so on can be provided for infrared connection modems. It is possible to plug in fixed telephones a multiplex communication server, that supports a local radio communication with goal to give a rent connection for creation of secure channels.
- These devices can be ordinary home radio telephones with attachment for multiplexing secure channels.
- These telephones can be private and can be putted on as communication servers, when their owners are absent. In this way the owners receive an additional profit and pseudomobile service that is given from them will be sufficiently unexpensive to be possible wide using of it.
- the undisassemble computer is installed in a special corpus, integrated with coupling, so it makes possible the facile pluging in different devices.
- the undisassemble computer plugs directly in the outputing machine .
- Each computer with plugged in a device of described kind can establish a secure channel for its owner.
- the method for creation of secure channel, described to this site can be used for user identification. In this way each bank should be able to identify the identity of its clients and to receive orders through the secure channel.
- the payment method by anonimous accounts would minorize the information amount in the system, because the information about made payments keeps in a short guarantee period, in that the transaction can be protested. After this period the information is deleted. It is not necessitated identity control nor it is made an archive of the account. There is only actual sum of account and to operate it is sufficiently to establish secure channel, associated with the account. When are used accounts of such kind, by an analogy with the cash money there can not be any interest for the person, from where the banks would finance this service.
- one of the disbursing sides establishes a secure channel to the payment serving center. It connects with the other side and makes its payment offer. If the user of the other device confirms the payment it is established a secure subchannel to his payment serving center through the connected device and the communication server of payment center of the first side.
- the paying person orders through his secure channel to his payment center to make the respective transfer to the recipient account.
- the payment center directly or by a payment agent transfers the wanted sum to the indicated account.
- the recipient waits for a payment notice through own secure channel. When he receives it, the transaction is ended. If there is a problem, in the guarantee period the transaction can be protested. In this case the whole information about the transaction must be kept and automaticaly must be locked the possibility to change the anonimous accounts to that moment when the case is solved, including by legal proceedings.
- Figure 1 Sheme of secure channels organization.
- Protocol server that is physically undi assemble.
- Figure 2 Section of undisassemble one— hip computer.
- Electrodes for meansuring the electric parameters of the interspace are Electrodes for meansuring the electric parameters of the interspace.
- Figure 3 Block diagram of the one chip computer.
- Noise generator random numbers generator
- Nonvolative memory 34. Volat ive memory with random access.
- the ciphering method is very important for the described method. It must resist statistics proceedings when there is multitime ciphering of known information by one and the same password. As a 03 it is solved putting in the ciphered file random information in formation of each ciphering process, it makes different the ciphered file every time.
- noise block filling in one block of size 256 byte with random permutation of numbers from 0 to 255. It is named noise block.
- the deciphering can be made using the same method excluding that, it is not added to the password the k-byte from the ciphered consecuence but the result from the operation XOR between the k—byte from the ciphered consecuence and the first byte from the password. Using this method is ciphered all internal data. So, even there is physical destruction of the undisassemble device to can not be established a secure channel using the received information without knowing the personal password.
- the method is used for secure channel with identification of the identity.
- the personal password do not figure in nonciphered form in the internal memory. It is disposed in a file, mixed by noise, that is ciphered using the economic method by the same personal password.
- the file is deciphered and in it is looking for a defined label, followed by the same password. If it is found the password is correct.
- the password is putted in an volative temporaly buffer and serves for deciphering of every one internal information before it using.
- the device is locked. It become to be unusiful, because there is not any password that can activate it. It is very important, because in the opposite case by an outside generator it is easy to discover the personal password, that is comparatively short. In the same way can be locked a channel.
- the internal memory is formed as a file system.
- the file names are the names of secure channels, for that is kept the information. For each file is kept information about its type.
- the file type determines the type of secure channel, that is built using it.
- the information is ciphered by the kept password (44) using the ciphering method. It is applied the procedure for passing a random marker (41,42) for making unique session.
- a secure channel When a secure channel must be established, first it waits for outside input of a personal password (46).
- the information (41,42,43) is ciphered by the kept internal password (44) according to the ciphering method and with the inputted personal password (46) according to the method for economic ciphering.
- Action Expects a name of a secure channel with identification. It cipheres the information as anonimous channel by the kept internal password (44) .
- each secure channel has a nonciphered part. These are, for example, the connection addresses and other information. This information is kept in an outside device.
- Generaly the method and the device according the method are forming a protocol server (11) of the secure channel. All the rest actions are processed by the user server (12), that establishes the secure channel (15,17).
- the device according to the method is made compact and undisassemble, integrated by a coupling for pluging in different devices.
- the device is one—chip computer preferable on the base of onocrystal. If it is impossible, then it can be made using a hybride technology as on a pad (21) are directly glued the crystals (22) of the necessary integrated circuits. In the two cases are taken all necessary means to be very hard disassembling and accessing information in the integrated circuit.
- the integrated circuit is putted in a metal courpus (26).
- the basic guarantee to not be there a physical intervention is the locking system (37) in case of physical destroying. It can be reached by a sensor box (24) , in which is disposed the one-chip computer.
- the sensor box (24) has production guaranteed unique structure.
- electrodes (25) in the box walls volume are meansured the electric parameters of the walls.
- the reseived results from electrodes (25) are normalized by a numeric method, to be eliminated the possible fluctuat ons.
- the received values are used for creation of a password for additional ciphering of the information.
- the sensor box is produced by pouring over the basic box (23) with installed electrodes (25) with an indurating substance using a technology that guarantees wide parameters tolerance.
- the password defending the system is formed automaticaly when the device is put on by digital meansuring of the electric parameters between the electrodes through a program managed multiplexed channel. In this way, even the producer do not know the password.
- nonvolative memory In the integrated circuit must be an nonvolative memory (33) , RAM for buffering means (34) , input/output buffered interface (36) , physical generator of random numbers (32) , powering voltage stabilizer with protection (38), data bus (39) , procesor (35) .
- the managing software is installed in the nonvolative memory.
- the software of the integrated circuit executes all functions for ciphering/deciphering and supporting the data ormat, executing outside commands or internal procedures.
- the software characteristics are defined in accordance with secure channels types , that are supported and the possible outside commands.
- the example channel types were yet examined, but here is the example command set:
- Input file name, number of bytes, type, [password], description
- Input Channel name, additional information depending of the channel type, information for sending.
- Input number of bytes, information block.
- the hardware switches may have only additional role — for conveniently use of the device and can indicate a contrary mode only if it is stronger than the mode indicated by the respective option.
- the secure channels as they are described are apropriate for transmition of confidential information and for user identification, that makes them applicable in many fields.
- patent application No 103505, dated 18 June 1999 before Patent Office of Republic of Bulgaria and in PCT/BGOO/00010 it is told, that to receive a ciphered certificate for a document in electronic form, it is used a secure channel for connection with the certificate center.
- the mentioned secure channel can be made according to the described method. In this way it receives a whole system for e—documents proceeding, including secure data transfer to the certificate center, document authenticity guaranteeing using ciphered document certificates issued by the certificate center and document recognition and proceeding, using a global document descriptor, may be through the secure channels.
- the secure anonimous channel is apropriate for pseudo cash e—pays, using an anonimous account.
- the secure channel can serve for notary certified remote delegation of a person. It includes property transfer, concluding agreements and so on, without the necessity of physical presense. An obvious application of the secure channel with identification is to serve as a access key.
- the described device can be used for other goals, for example as a card for shop reduction in price or as electronic voting-paper. To be used as a voting—paper the device receives the opportunity to create an anonimous secure channel to the central election commi ion. Through the secure channel can be received the voting paper, it may be filled in and may be returned through the channel, the channel becomes locked.
- the described system for data protection by the locking system for a case of physical intervention can be used separately for electronic data protection.
- the method and the device can guarantee the personal inviolability in the conditions of the global information spreading.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
AU76345/00A AU7634500A (en) | 1999-10-18 | 2000-10-12 | Method and apparatus for creation of secure communications channel, identification and payment |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
BG103821A BG63887B1 (en) | 1999-10-18 | 1999-10-18 | Method and device for forming a safe connection channel, identification and making of payments |
BG103821 | 1999-10-18 |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2001030044A2 true WO2001030044A2 (en) | 2001-04-26 |
WO2001030044A3 WO2001030044A3 (en) | 2002-01-10 |
Family
ID=3927918
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/BG2000/000026 WO2001030044A2 (en) | 1999-10-18 | 2000-10-12 | Method and apparatus for creation of secure communications channel, identification and payment |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
AU (1) | AU7634500A (en) |
BG (1) | BG63887B1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2001030044A2 (en) |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US8782414B2 (en) | 2007-05-07 | 2014-07-15 | Microsoft Corporation | Mutually authenticated secure channel |
WO2020197729A1 (en) * | 2019-03-25 | 2020-10-01 | Micron Technology, Inc. | Remotely managing devices using blockchain and dice-riot |
Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5500897A (en) * | 1993-07-22 | 1996-03-19 | International Business Machines Corporation | Client/server based secure timekeeping system |
US5812764A (en) * | 1997-01-30 | 1998-09-22 | International Business Machines | Password management system over a communications network |
EP0869651A1 (en) * | 1997-04-01 | 1998-10-07 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson | A method and apparatus for secure data communication |
WO1999006928A1 (en) * | 1997-07-31 | 1999-02-11 | Spring Technologies, Inc. | System and method utilizing biometric identification for controlling access to events and transportation systems |
WO1999034551A1 (en) * | 1997-12-29 | 1999-07-08 | Mordhai Barkan | Method for safe communications |
-
1999
- 1999-10-18 BG BG103821A patent/BG63887B1/en unknown
-
2000
- 2000-10-12 AU AU76345/00A patent/AU7634500A/en not_active Abandoned
- 2000-10-12 WO PCT/BG2000/000026 patent/WO2001030044A2/en active Application Filing
Patent Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5500897A (en) * | 1993-07-22 | 1996-03-19 | International Business Machines Corporation | Client/server based secure timekeeping system |
US5812764A (en) * | 1997-01-30 | 1998-09-22 | International Business Machines | Password management system over a communications network |
EP0869651A1 (en) * | 1997-04-01 | 1998-10-07 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson | A method and apparatus for secure data communication |
WO1999006928A1 (en) * | 1997-07-31 | 1999-02-11 | Spring Technologies, Inc. | System and method utilizing biometric identification for controlling access to events and transportation systems |
WO1999034551A1 (en) * | 1997-12-29 | 1999-07-08 | Mordhai Barkan | Method for safe communications |
Cited By (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US8782414B2 (en) | 2007-05-07 | 2014-07-15 | Microsoft Corporation | Mutually authenticated secure channel |
WO2020197729A1 (en) * | 2019-03-25 | 2020-10-01 | Micron Technology, Inc. | Remotely managing devices using blockchain and dice-riot |
US11128451B2 (en) | 2019-03-25 | 2021-09-21 | Micron Technology, Inc. | Remotely managing devices using blockchain and DICE-RIoT |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
AU7634500A (en) | 2001-04-30 |
BG103821A (en) | 2001-04-30 |
BG63887B1 (en) | 2003-04-30 |
WO2001030044A3 (en) | 2002-01-10 |
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