WO1999025092A1 - Masked digital signatures - Google Patents
Masked digital signatures Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO1999025092A1 WO1999025092A1 PCT/CA1998/001040 CA9801040W WO9925092A1 WO 1999025092 A1 WO1999025092 A1 WO 1999025092A1 CA 9801040 W CA9801040 W CA 9801040W WO 9925092 A1 WO9925092 A1 WO 9925092A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- signature
- short term
- private key
- computing
- component
- Prior art date
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 24
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 9
- 230000007774 longterm Effects 0.000 claims description 8
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 abstract description 8
- 238000007620 mathematical function Methods 0.000 abstract 2
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000006243 chemical reaction Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 2
- 239000000654 additive Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000000996 additive effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001934 delay Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
- H04L9/3252—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using DSA or related signature schemes, e.g. elliptic based signatures, ElGamal or Schnorr schemes
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/04—Masking or blinding
Definitions
- This invention relates to a method of accelerating digital signature operations used in secure communication systems, and in particular for use with processors having limited computing power.
- One of the functions performed by a cryptosystem is the computation of digital signatures that are used to confirm that a particular party has originated a message and that the contents have not been altered during transmission.
- a widely used set of signature protocols utilizes the ElGamal public key signature scheme that signs a message with the sender's private key. The recipient may then recover the message with the sender's public key.
- the ElGamal scheme gets its security from calculating discrete logarithms in a finite field.
- these cryptosystems can be computationally intensive.
- Modulo a number the generation of each of the doubled points requires the computation of both the x and y coordinates and the latter requires a further inversion. These steps are computationally complex and therefore require either significant time or computing power to perform. Inversion is computationally intensive, and generally performed within a secure boundary where computational power is limited thus it would be advantageous to perform such calculations outside the secure boundary, particularly where computational power is more readily available. This however cannot be done directly on the ECDSA signature scheme without potentially compromising the private key information. Therefore there exists a need for a method of performing at least part of a signature operation outside a secure boundary while still maintaining an existing level of security in current signature schemes.
- This invention seeks to provide a digital signature method, which may be implemented relatively efficiently on a processor with limited processing capability, such as a 'smart card' or the like.
- a method of signing and authenticating a message m in a public key data communication system comprising the steps of : in a secure computer system: (a) generating a first short term private key k;
- a processing means for assigning a message m without performing inversion operations and including a long term private key contained within a secure boundary and a long term public key derived from the private key and a generator of predetermined order in a field, the processing means comprising: within the secure boundary; means for generating a first short term private key; means for generating a second short term private key; means for generating a first signature component using at least the second short term session key; and generating a masked signature component using the first and second short term session keys to produce masked signature components of the message m.
- Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a communication system
- a data communication system 10 includes a pair of correspondents, designated as a sender 12, and a recipient 14, who are connected by a communication channel 16.
- Each of the correspondents 12,14 includes an encryption unit 18,20 respectively that may process digital information and prepare it for transmission through the channel 16 as will be described below.
- the sender is the party signing a message m to be verified by the recipient.
- the signature is generally performed in the encryption unit 18 and normally defines a secure boundary.
- the sender could be a 'smart card', a terminal or similar device. If for example the signor is a 'smart card', it generally has limited processing power.
- the 'smart card' is typically used in conjunction with a terminal 22 which has at least some computing power.
- the 'smart card' is inserted into a terminal 22 which then forwards digital information received from the 'smart card' 12 along the channel 16 to the recipient 14.
- the terminal may preprocess this information before sending it along the channel 16.
- the invention describes in a broad aspect a signature algorithm in which the private key is masked to generate masked signature components which may then be converted to a regular signature prior to the verification of the signature.
- a second statistically unique and unpredictable integer the second short-term private key is selected such that 2 ⁇ t ⁇ (n-2).
- the ⁇ CDSA signature of the sender 12 is then s and r.
- the signature (s , r) can then be verified as a normal ⁇ CDSA signature as described below.
- the sender can either forward the masked ⁇ CDSA signature (s,r,c) to the verifier where the verifier can do the conversion operation to obtain the signature
- the sender can perform the conversion outside the secure boundary, as for example in a terminal and then forward the DSA signature (s , r) to the verifier.
- an advantage of the masked ECDSA is that modular inverse operation of the normal ECDSA is avoided for the masked signing operation. As stated earlier this is very useful for some applications with limited computational power.
- the masked signature to ECDSA signature conversion operation can be performed outside the secure boundary protecting the private key of the sender. For example if the sender was a 'smart card' that communicated with a card reader then this operation could be performed in the 'smart card' reader.
- the present invention is thus generally concerned with an encryption method and system and particularly an elliptic curve encryption method and system in which finite field elements are multiplied in a processor efficient manner.
- the encryption system can comprise any suitable processor unit such as a suitably programmed general-purpose computer.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP98952478A EP1033009B1 (en) | 1997-11-10 | 1998-11-10 | Masked digital signatures |
CA002308170A CA2308170C (en) | 1997-11-10 | 1998-11-10 | Masked digital signatures |
AU10175/99A AU1017599A (en) | 1997-11-10 | 1998-11-10 | Masked digital signatures |
JP2000519973A JP4649040B2 (en) | 1997-11-10 | 1998-11-10 | Mask digital signature |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US08/966,702 US6279110B1 (en) | 1997-11-10 | 1997-11-10 | Masked digital signatures |
US08/966,702 | 1997-11-10 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO1999025092A1 true WO1999025092A1 (en) | 1999-05-20 |
Family
ID=25511765
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/CA1998/001040 WO1999025092A1 (en) | 1997-11-10 | 1998-11-10 | Masked digital signatures |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (6) | US6279110B1 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1033009B1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP4649040B2 (en) |
AU (1) | AU1017599A (en) |
CA (1) | CA2308170C (en) |
WO (1) | WO1999025092A1 (en) |
Cited By (7)
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WO1999067920A1 (en) * | 1998-06-23 | 1999-12-29 | Microsoft Corporation | A technique for producing privately authenticatable cryptographic signatures and for using such a signature in conjunction with a product copy |
US6163841A (en) * | 1998-06-23 | 2000-12-19 | Microsoft Corporation | Technique for producing privately authenticatable cryptographic signatures and for authenticating such signatures |
US7885411B2 (en) | 2004-04-02 | 2011-02-08 | Research In Motion Limited | Key agreement and re-keying over a bidirectional communication path |
JP4870155B2 (en) * | 2005-05-20 | 2012-02-08 | サーティコム コーポレーション | Electronic passport authentication protocol with enhanced privacy |
US8713321B2 (en) | 2003-10-28 | 2014-04-29 | Certicom Corp. | Method and apparatus for verifiable generation of public keys |
WO2014146882A1 (en) * | 2013-03-18 | 2014-09-25 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Computation unit and method for providing a digital signature |
EP2890049A1 (en) * | 2013-12-31 | 2015-07-01 | Nxp B.V. | Method to reduce the latency of ecdsa signature generation using precomputation |
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US10181953B1 (en) | 2013-09-16 | 2019-01-15 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Trusted data verification |
US6424712B2 (en) * | 1997-10-17 | 2002-07-23 | Certicom Corp. | Accelerated signature verification on an elliptic curve |
US6279110B1 (en) * | 1997-11-10 | 2001-08-21 | Certicom Corporation | Masked digital signatures |
US7599491B2 (en) * | 1999-01-11 | 2009-10-06 | Certicom Corp. | Method for strengthening the implementation of ECDSA against power analysis |
US7092523B2 (en) * | 1999-01-11 | 2006-08-15 | Certicom Corp. | Method and apparatus for minimizing differential power attacks on processors |
US7249259B1 (en) * | 1999-09-07 | 2007-07-24 | Certicom Corp. | Hybrid signature scheme |
US20020026584A1 (en) * | 2000-06-05 | 2002-02-28 | Janez Skubic | Method for signing documents using a PC and a personal terminal device |
US7181017B1 (en) * | 2001-03-23 | 2007-02-20 | David Felsher | System and method for secure three-party communications |
US9818136B1 (en) | 2003-02-05 | 2017-11-14 | Steven M. Hoffberg | System and method for determining contingent relevance |
US8261062B2 (en) | 2003-03-27 | 2012-09-04 | Microsoft Corporation | Non-cryptographic addressing |
US20050177715A1 (en) * | 2004-02-09 | 2005-08-11 | Microsoft Corporation | Method and system for managing identities in a peer-to-peer networking environment |
US7716726B2 (en) * | 2004-02-13 | 2010-05-11 | Microsoft Corporation | System and method for protecting a computing device from computer exploits delivered over a networked environment in a secured communication |
US7814543B2 (en) * | 2004-02-13 | 2010-10-12 | Microsoft Corporation | System and method for securing a computer system connected to a network from attacks |
US7603716B2 (en) * | 2004-02-13 | 2009-10-13 | Microsoft Corporation | Distributed network security service |
US7929689B2 (en) | 2004-06-30 | 2011-04-19 | Microsoft Corporation | Call signs |
US7716727B2 (en) * | 2004-10-29 | 2010-05-11 | Microsoft Corporation | Network security device and method for protecting a computing device in a networked environment |
US8467535B2 (en) * | 2005-01-18 | 2013-06-18 | Certicom Corp. | Accelerated verification of digital signatures and public keys |
EP2395424B1 (en) | 2005-01-18 | 2013-07-31 | Certicom Corp. | Accelerated verification of digital signatures and public keys |
CA2542556C (en) | 2005-06-03 | 2014-09-16 | Tata Consultancy Services Limited | An authentication system executing an elliptic curve digital signature cryptographic process |
US8874477B2 (en) | 2005-10-04 | 2014-10-28 | Steven Mark Hoffberg | Multifactorial optimization system and method |
US20070124584A1 (en) * | 2005-11-30 | 2007-05-31 | Microsoft Corporation | Proving ownership of shared information to a third party |
US8086842B2 (en) | 2006-04-21 | 2011-12-27 | Microsoft Corporation | Peer-to-peer contact exchange |
CA2669472C (en) * | 2006-11-13 | 2015-11-24 | Certicom Corp. | Compressed ecdsa signatures |
US8219820B2 (en) * | 2007-03-07 | 2012-07-10 | Research In Motion Limited | Power analysis countermeasure for the ECMQV key agreement algorithm |
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US8144940B2 (en) * | 2008-08-07 | 2012-03-27 | Clay Von Mueller | System and method for authentication of data |
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US8775813B2 (en) * | 2010-02-26 | 2014-07-08 | Certicom Corp. | ElGamal signature schemes |
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US9203613B2 (en) | 2011-09-29 | 2015-12-01 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Techniques for client constructed sessions |
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US9178701B2 (en) | 2011-09-29 | 2015-11-03 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Parameter based key derivation |
US8745376B2 (en) | 2011-10-14 | 2014-06-03 | Certicom Corp. | Verifying implicit certificates and digital signatures |
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US8892865B1 (en) | 2012-03-27 | 2014-11-18 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Multiple authority key derivation |
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US8739308B1 (en) | 2012-03-27 | 2014-05-27 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Source identification for unauthorized copies of content |
US9258118B1 (en) | 2012-06-25 | 2016-02-09 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Decentralized verification in a distributed system |
US9660972B1 (en) | 2012-06-25 | 2017-05-23 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Protection from data security threats |
US9407440B2 (en) | 2013-06-20 | 2016-08-02 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Multiple authority data security and access |
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US9237019B2 (en) | 2013-09-25 | 2016-01-12 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Resource locators with keys |
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US9262642B1 (en) | 2014-01-13 | 2016-02-16 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Adaptive client-aware session security as a service |
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US10326597B1 (en) | 2014-06-27 | 2019-06-18 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Dynamic response signing capability in a distributed system |
US10002256B2 (en) | 2014-12-05 | 2018-06-19 | GeoLang Ltd. | Symbol string matching mechanism |
US9800418B2 (en) | 2015-05-26 | 2017-10-24 | Infosec Global Inc. | Signature protocol |
US10122689B2 (en) | 2015-06-16 | 2018-11-06 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Load balancing with handshake offload |
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FR3085215B1 (en) * | 2018-08-21 | 2020-11-20 | Maxim Integrated Products | DEVICES AND METHODS FOR MASKING ECC CRYPTOGRAPHY OPERATIONS |
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US11601284B2 (en) * | 2019-06-14 | 2023-03-07 | Planetway Corporation | Digital signature system based on a cloud of dedicated local devices |
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GB2313272A (en) * | 1996-05-15 | 1997-11-19 | Certicom Corp | Digital signature protocol with reduced bandwidth |
EP0807908A2 (en) * | 1996-04-16 | 1997-11-19 | Certicom Corp. | Digital signatures on a smartcard |
GB2321834A (en) * | 1997-01-31 | 1998-08-05 | Certicom Corp | Cryptographic signature verification using two private keys. |
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1997
- 1997-11-10 US US08/966,702 patent/US6279110B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
-
1998
- 1998-11-10 WO PCT/CA1998/001040 patent/WO1999025092A1/en active Application Filing
- 1998-11-10 EP EP98952478A patent/EP1033009B1/en not_active Revoked
- 1998-11-10 CA CA002308170A patent/CA2308170C/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1998-11-10 AU AU10175/99A patent/AU1017599A/en not_active Abandoned
- 1998-11-10 JP JP2000519973A patent/JP4649040B2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
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2001
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2007
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2009
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2011
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2012
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Title |
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Cited By (14)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1999067920A1 (en) * | 1998-06-23 | 1999-12-29 | Microsoft Corporation | A technique for producing privately authenticatable cryptographic signatures and for using such a signature in conjunction with a product copy |
US6163841A (en) * | 1998-06-23 | 2000-12-19 | Microsoft Corporation | Technique for producing privately authenticatable cryptographic signatures and for authenticating such signatures |
US9967239B2 (en) | 2003-10-28 | 2018-05-08 | Certicom Corp. | Method and apparatus for verifiable generation of public keys |
US9240884B2 (en) | 2003-10-28 | 2016-01-19 | Certicom Corp. | Method and apparatus for verifiable generation of public keys |
US9160530B2 (en) | 2003-10-28 | 2015-10-13 | Certicom Corp. | Method and apparatus for verifiable generation of public keys |
US8713321B2 (en) | 2003-10-28 | 2014-04-29 | Certicom Corp. | Method and apparatus for verifiable generation of public keys |
US8615086B2 (en) | 2004-04-02 | 2013-12-24 | Blackberry Limited | Key agreement and re-keying over a bidirectional communication path |
US8238558B2 (en) | 2004-04-02 | 2012-08-07 | Research In Motion Limited | Key agreement and re-keying over a bidirectional communication path |
US8090107B2 (en) | 2004-04-02 | 2012-01-03 | Research In Motion Limited | Key agreement and re-keying over a bidirectional communication path |
US7885411B2 (en) | 2004-04-02 | 2011-02-08 | Research In Motion Limited | Key agreement and re-keying over a bidirectional communication path |
JP4870155B2 (en) * | 2005-05-20 | 2012-02-08 | サーティコム コーポレーション | Electronic passport authentication protocol with enhanced privacy |
WO2014146882A1 (en) * | 2013-03-18 | 2014-09-25 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Computation unit and method for providing a digital signature |
EP2890049A1 (en) * | 2013-12-31 | 2015-07-01 | Nxp B.V. | Method to reduce the latency of ecdsa signature generation using precomputation |
US10135621B2 (en) | 2013-12-31 | 2018-11-20 | Nxp B.V. | Method to reduce the latency of ECDSA signature generation using precomputation |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
JP2001523067A (en) | 2001-11-20 |
US20090319790A1 (en) | 2009-12-24 |
CA2308170A1 (en) | 1999-05-20 |
US7552329B2 (en) | 2009-06-23 |
US20080005570A1 (en) | 2008-01-03 |
US8732467B2 (en) | 2014-05-20 |
US8359468B2 (en) | 2013-01-22 |
AU1017599A (en) | 1999-05-31 |
CA2308170C (en) | 2009-12-22 |
EP1033009B1 (en) | 2013-01-16 |
US7996676B2 (en) | 2011-08-09 |
US20130145168A1 (en) | 2013-06-06 |
JP4649040B2 (en) | 2011-03-09 |
US6279110B1 (en) | 2001-08-21 |
US20010008013A1 (en) | 2001-07-12 |
US7260723B2 (en) | 2007-08-21 |
US20110258455A1 (en) | 2011-10-20 |
EP1033009A1 (en) | 2000-09-06 |
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