|Publication number||USRE43500 E1|
|Application number||US 12/720,207|
|Publication date||3 Jul 2012|
|Filing date||9 Mar 2010|
|Priority date||7 Aug 2004|
|Also published as||US7484247, US20060031940, USRE43103, USRE43528, USRE43529, USRE43987|
|Publication number||12720207, 720207, US RE43500 E1, US RE43500E1, US-E1-RE43500, USRE43500 E1, USRE43500E1|
|Inventors||Allen F. Rozman, Alfonso J. Cioffi|
|Original Assignee||Rozman Allen F, Cioffi Alfonso J|
|Export Citation||BiBTeX, EndNote, RefMan|
|Patent Citations (113), Non-Patent Citations (48), Referenced by (4), Classifications (21), Legal Events (2)|
|External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, Espacenet|
This application is a reissue application of U.S. Pat. No. 7,484,247, entitled “System and Method for Protecting a Computer System from Malicious Software,” issued on Jan. 27, 2009, and is related to another reissue application designated U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/720,147 from U.S. Pat. No. 7,484,247 filed concurrently herewith, which are incorporated herein by reference. This application is also related to another reissue application designated U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/854,149 (now, U.S. Pat. No. Re. 43,103) from U.S. Pat. No. 7,484,247 filed on Aug. 10, 2010 and a continuation application therefrom designated U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/015,186 filed on Jan. 27, 2011, which are incorporated herein by reference. This application is also related to another reissue application designated U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/941,067 from U.S. Pat. No. 7,484,247 filed on Nov. 7, 2010, which is incorporated herein by reference.
The present invention relates generally to computer hardware and software, and more particularly to a system and method for protecting a computer system from malicious software.
This application is related to the following U.S. patents and applications:
U.S. patent or
Polymorphic virus detection
Detection and elimination of macro
Fast virus scanning using session
Flint, et al
Validating components of a
Muttik, et al.
System and process for main-
Eschelbeck, et al.
taining a plurality of remote
security applications using a
modular framework in a distributed
Method for software distribution
Fuller, et al.
and compensation with
Flexible window management on a
Dawes, et al.
Windowed computer display.
Multiple window generation in
Window grouping mechanism for
creating, manipulating and
displaying windows and window
groups on a display screen of a
Video graphics display system with
Goddard, et al.
adapter for display management
based upon plural memory sources.
Memory mapped interface between
host computer and graphics system.
Method and apparatus for display
Buswell, et al
of windowing application programs
on a terminal.
Multi-function controller and
method for a computer graphics
Method and apparatus for
Lee, et al.
providing security for servers
executing application programs
received via a network
Method and system for maintaining
Rechef, et al.
restricted operating environments
for application programs or
Security enhancement for untrusted
Bond, et al.
Method and system for protecting
Reshef, et al.
operations of trusted internal
System and method for securing a
Mueller, et al.
program's execution in a network
Schmidt, et al.
automatic apparatus and method
for receiving, installing and
launching applications from a
browser on a client computer.
Protecting resources in a
Bischof, et al
distributed computer system.
Executing isolated mode
Ellison, et al.
instructions in a secure system
running in privilege rings.
Controlling access to multiple
Ellison, et al.
memory zones in an isolated
Controlling access to multiple
Ellison, et al.
isolated memories in an isolated
Video hardware for protected,
Method for securely creating,
Angelo, et al.
storing and using encryption keys
in a computer system.
Computer network security device
Personal computer having a master
computer system and in internet
computer system and monitoring a
condition of said master and
internet computer systems
PUB Application #
E-mail software and method and
Jacobs, Paul E.,
system for distributing advertise-
ments to client devices that have
such e-mail software installed
PUB Application #
System and method for compre-
Mayer, Yaron; et
hensive general generic protection
for computers against malicious
programs that may steal
information and/or cause damages
PUB Application #
System and method for providing
security to a remote computer over
a network browser interface.
PUB Application #
Virus protection in an internet
PUB Application #
System and method for protecting
Pham, Khai; et
computer users from web sites
hosting computer viruses.
PUB Application #
Malware infection suppression.
PUB Application #
Access control for computers.
PUB Application #
Detecting malicious alteration of
stored computer files.
Joseph; et al.
The above-listed U.S. Patents and U.S. patent applications are incorporated by reference as if reproduced herein in their entirety.
The very popular and ubiquitous rise of the ‘personal’ computer system as an essential business tool and home appliance, together with the exponential growth of the Internet as a means of providing information flows across a wide variety of connected computing devices, has changed the way people live and work. Information in the form of data files and executable software programs regularly flows across the planetary wide system of interconnected computers and data storage devices.
Popular and ubiquitous computer hardware and software architectures have typically been designed to allow for open interconnection via, for example, the internet, a VPN, a LAN, or a WAN, with information often capable of being freely shared between the interconnected computers. This open interconnection architecture has contributed to the adoption and mainstream usage of these computers and the subsequent interconnection of vast networks of computers. This easy to use system has given rise to the explosive popularity of applications such as email, internet browsing, search engines, interactive gaming, instant messaging, and many, many more.
Although there are definite benefits to this open interconnection architecture, a lack of security against unwanted incursions into the computers main processing and non-volatile memory space has emerged as a significant problem. An aspect of some current computer architectures that has contributed to the security problem is that by default programs are typically allowed to interact with and/or alter other programs and data files, including critical operating system files, such as the windows registry, for example. Current open interconnection architectures have opened the door to a new class of unwanted malicious software generally known a malware. This malware is capable of infiltrating any computer system which is connected to a network of interconnected computer systems. Malware is comprised of, but not limited to, classes of software files known as viruses, worms, Trojan horses, browser hijackers, adware, spyware, pop-up windows, data miners, etc. Such malware attacks are capable of stealing data by sending user keystrokes or information stored on a user's computer back to a host, changing data or destroying data on personal computers and/or servers and/or other computerized devices, especially through the Internet. In the least, these items represent a nuisance that interferes with the smooth operation of the computer system, and in the extreme, can lead to the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information stored on the computer system, significant degradation of computer system performance, or the complete collapse of computer system function.
Malware has recently become much more sophisticated and much more difficult for users to deal with. Once resident on a computer system, many malware programs are designed to protect themselves from deletion. For example, some malware programs comprise a pair of programs running simultaneously, with each program monitoring the other for deletion. If one of the pair of programs is deleted, the other program installs a replacement within milliseconds. In another example, some malware will run as a Windows program with a .dlls extension, which Windows may not allow a user to delete while it is executing. Malware may also reset a user's browser home page, change browser settings, or hijack search requests and direct such requests to another page or search engine. Further, the malware is often designed to defeat the user's attempts to reset the browser settings to their original values. In another example, some malware programs secretly record user input commands (such as keystrokes), then send the information back to a host computer. This type of malware is capable of stealing important user information, such as passwords, credit account numbers, etc.
Many existing computers rely on a special set of instructions which define an operating system (O/S) in order to provide an interface for computer programs and computer components such as the computer's memory and central processing unit (CPU). Many current operating systems have a multi-tasking capability which allows multiple computer programs to run simultaneously, with each program not having to wait for termination of another in order to execute instructions. Multi-tasking O/S's allow programs to execute simultaneously by allowing programs to share resources with other programs. For example, an operating system running multiple programs executing at the same time allows the programs to share the computer's CPU time. Programs which run on the same system, even if not simultaneously with other programs, share space on the same nonvolatile memory storage medium. Programs which are executing simultaneously are presently able to place binaries and data in the same physical memory at the same time, limited to a certain degree by the O/S restrictions and policy, to the extent that these are properly implemented. Memory segments are shared by programs being serviced by the O/S, in the same manner. O/S resources, such as threads, process tables and memory segments, are shared by programs executing simultaneously as well.
While allowing programs to share resources has many benefits, there are resulting security related ramifications, particularly regarding malware programs. Security problems include allowing the malware program: to capitalize CPU time, leaving other programs with little or no CPU time; to read, forge, write, delete or otherwise corrupt files created by other programs; to read, forge, write, delete or otherwise corrupt executable files of other programs, including the O/S itself; and to read and write memory locations used by other programs to thus corrupt execution of those programs.
In the case of a computer connected to the Internet, the computer may run an O/S, with several user applications, together comprising a known and trusted set of programs, concurrently with an Internet browser, possibly requiring the execution of downloaded code, such as Java applets, or EXE/COM executables, with the latter programs possibly containing malware. Many security features and products are being built by software manufacturers and by O/S programmers to prevent malware infiltrations from taking place, and to ensure the correct level of isolation between programs. Among these are architectural solutions such as rings-of-protection in which different trust levels are assigned to memory portions and tasks, paging which includes mapping of logical memory into physical portions or pages, allowing different tasks to have different mapping, with the pages having different trust levels, and segmentation which involves mapping logical memory into logical portions or segments, each segment having its own trust level wherein each task may reference a different set of segments. Since the sharing capabilities using traditional operating systems are extensive, so are the security features. However, the more complex the security mechanism is, the more options a malware practitioner has to bypass the security and to hack or corrupt other programs or the O/S itself, sometimes using these very features that allow sharing and communication between programs to do so.
Further, regarding malware programs, for virtually every software security mechanism, a malware practitioner has found a way to subvert, or hack around, the security system, allowing a malware program to cause harm to other programs in the shared environment. This includes every operating system and even the Java language, which was designed to create a standard interface, or sandbox, for Internet downloadable programs or applets.
Major vulnerabilities of existing computer systems lies in the architectures of the computer system and of the operating system itself. A typical multi-tasking O/S environment includes an O/S kernel loaded in the computer random access memory (RAM) at start-up of the computer. The O/S kernel is a minimal set of instructions which loads and off-loads resources and resource vectors into RAM as called upon by individual programs executing on the computer. Sometimes, when two or more executing programs require the same resource, such as printer output, for example, the O/S kernel leaves the resource loaded in RAM until all programs have finished with that resource. Other resources, such as disk read and write, are left in RAM while the operating system is running because such resources are more often used than others. The inherent problem with existing architectures is that resources, such as RAM, or a hard disk, are shared by programs simultaneously, giving a malware program a conduit to access and corrupt other programs, or the O/S itself through the shared resource. Furthermore, as many application programs are of a general nature, many features are enabled by default or by the O/S, thus in many cases bypassing the O/S security mechanism. Such is the case when a device driver or daemon is run by the O/S in kernel mode, which enables it unrestricted access to many if not all the resources.
The most common state-of the-art solutions for preventing malware infiltration are software based, such as blockers, sweepers and firewalls, for example, and hardware based solutions such as router/firewalls. Examples of software designed to counter malware are Norton Systems Works, distributed by the Symantec Corporation, Ad-aware, distributed by the Lavasoft Corporation of Sweeden, Spy Sweeper, distributed by the Webroot Software Corporation, Spyware Guard, distributed by Javacool Software LLC, among others. Currently there are a plethora of freeware, shareware and purchased software programs designed to counter malware by a variety of means. Such anti-malware programs are limited because they can only detect known malware that has already been identified (usually after the malware has already attacked one or more computers).
Network firewalls are typically based on packet filtering, which is limited in principle, since the rules determining which packets to accept and which to reject may contain subjective decisions based on trusting known sites or known applications. However, once security is breached for any reason (for example, due to a software or hardware error, a new piece of malware unrecognized by the anti-malware program or firewall, or an intended deception), a malicious application may take over the computer or server or possibly the entire network and create unlimited damages (directly or indirectly by opening the door to additional malicious applications).
The methods in the prior art are typically comprised of embedded software countermeasures that detect and filter unwanted intrusions in real time, or scan the computer system either at the direction of a user or as a scheduled event. Two problems arise from these methods. In the first instance, a comprehensive scan, detect, and elimination of malware from desired incoming data streams could significantly slow or preclude the interactive nature of many applications such a gaming, messaging, and browsing. In the second instance, newly implemented software screens may be quickly circumvented by malware practitioners who are determined to pass their files through the screen. Newly discovered malware leads to the development of additional screens, which lead to more malware, etc., thus creating an escalating cycle of measure, countermeasure. The basic flaw is that all incoming executable data files must be resident on the computers main processor to perform their desired function. Once resident on that processor, access may be gained to non-volatile memory and other basic computer system elements. Malware exploits this key architectural flaw to infiltrate and compromise computer systems.
The majority of these applications rely upon a scanning engine which searches suspect files for the presence of predetermined malware signatures. These signatures are held in a database which must be constantly updated to reflect the most recently identified malware. Typically, users regularly download replacement databases, either over the Internet, from a received e-mail, or from a CDROM or floppy disc. Users are also expected to update their software engines every so often in order to take advantage of new virus detection techniques (e.g. which may be required when a new strain of malware is detected).
Many of the aforementioned applications are also not effective against security holes, for example, in browsers or e-mail programs, or in the operating system itself. Security holes in critical applications are discovered quite often, and just keeping up with all the patches is cumbersome. Also, without proper generic protection against, for example, Trojan horses, even VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) and other forms of data encryption, including digital signatures, are not totally safe because information can be stolen before or below the encryption layer. Even personal firewalls are typically limited, because once a program is allowed to access the Internet, there are often few limitations on what files may be accessed and transmitted back to a host.
A major problem faced by computer users connected to a network is that the network interface program (a browser, for example) is resident on the same processor as the O/S and other trusted programs, and shares space on a common memory storage medium. Even with security designed into the O/S, malware practitioners have demonstrated great skill in circumventing software security measures to create malware capable of corrupting critical files on the shared memory storage medium. When this happens, users are often faced with a lengthy process of restoring their computer systems to the correct configuration, and often important files are simply lost because no backup exists.
Therefore, what is needed in the art is a means of isolating the network interface program from the main computer system such that the network interface program does not share a common memory storage area with other trusted programs. The network interface program may be advantageously given access to a separate, protected memory area, while being unable to initiate access to the main computer's memory storage area. With the network interface program constrained in this way, malware programs are rendered unable to automatically corrupt critical system and user files located on the main memory storage area. If a malware infection occurs, a user would be able to completely clean the malware infection from the computer using a variety of methods. A user could simply delete all files contained in the protected memory area, and restore them from an image residing on the main memory area, for example.
Other discussions of malware, its effects on computer systems, techniques used by malware practitioners to install malware, and techniques for detection and removal, may be found in the published literature, and in some of the patents and applications previously incorporated by reference. Reference to malware may be found in a technical white paper entitled “Spyware, Adware, and Peer-to-Peer Networks: The Hidden Threat to Corporate Security.”, by Kevin Townsend, © Pest Patrol Inc. 2003. Pest Patrol is a Carlisle; Pa. based developer of software security tools. Another reference is a technical white paper entitled “Beyond Viruses: Why antivirus software is no longer enough.” by David Stang, PhD, © Pest Patrol Inc. 2002. Yet another reference is “The Web: Threat or Menace?” from “Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker”, Second Edition, Addison-Wesley. ISBN 0-201-63466-X, Copyright 2003. The foregoing references are incorporated by reference as if reproduced herein in their entirety.
Embodiments of the present invention achieve technical advantages as a system and method for protecting a computer system from malicious software attacks via a network connection.
It is an object of the present invention to provide a computer system capable of preventing malware programs from automatically corrupting critical user and system files.
It is another object of the present invention to confine any malware infection that may occur to a separate, protected part of the computer system.
It is another object of the present invention to provide a user with an easy and comprehensive method of removing the malware infection, even if the user's anti-malware software is incapable of detecting and/or removing the malware infection.
It is another object of the present invention to provide a user with an easy and comprehensive method of restoring critical system and user files that may have been corrupted by a malware infection.
It is another object of the present invention to provide a computer system configured such that attempts by malware to record and report data entry by the computer user via input devices such as keyboards, mouse clicks, microphones, or any other data input devices are effectively blocked.
It is another object of the present invention to provide a computer system capable of executing instructions in a first logical process, wherein the first logical process is capable of accessing data contained in a first memory space and a second memory space.
It is another object of the present invention to provide a computer system capable of executing instructions in a second logical process, wherein the second logical process is capable of accessing data contained in the second memory space, the second logical process being further capable of exchanging data across a network of one or more computers.
It is another object of the present invention to provide a computer system capable of displaying, in a windowed format on a display terminal, data from the first logical process and the second logical process, wherein a video processor is adapted to combine data from the first and second logical processes and transmit the combined data to the display terminal
It is another object of the present invention to provide a computer system configured such that a malware program downloaded from the network and executing as part of the second logical process is incapable of initiating access to the first memory space.
It is another object of the present invention to provide a computer system configured such that corrupted data files residing on the second memory space may be restored from an image residing on the first memory space.
It is another object of the present invention to provide a computer system configured such that data files residing on the second memory space may be automatically deleted when the second logical process is terminated.
It is another object of the present invention to provide a computer system configured such that the second electronic data processor and the video processor are co-located on a circuit card, the circuit card being communicatively coupled to the first electronic data processor.
These objects and other advantages are provided by a preferred embodiment of the present invention wherein a computer system comprising a first electronic data processor is communicatively coupled to a first memory space and to a second memory space, a second electronic data processor is communicatively coupled to the second memory space and to a network interface device, wherein the second electronic data processor is capable of exchanging data across a network of one or more computers via the network interface device, a video processor is adapted to combine video data from the first and second electronic data processors and transmit the combined video data to a display terminal for displaying the combined video data in a windowed format, wherein the computer system is configured such that a malware program downloaded from the network and executing on the second electronic data processor is incapable of initiating access to the first memory space.
For a more complete understanding of the present invention, and the advantages thereof, reference is now made to the following descriptions taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:
The making and using of the presently preferred embodiments are discussed in detail below. It should be appreciated, however, that the present invention provides many applicable inventive concepts that can be embodied in a wide variety of specific contexts. The specific embodiments discussed are merely illustrative of specific ways to make and use the invention, and do not limit the scope of the invention.
A computer system, constructed in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, is illustrated in
The first memory and data storage area 110 may comprise both volatile and nonvolatile memory devices, such as DRAMs and hard drives, respectively. Any memory structure and/or device capable of being communicatively coupled to P1 may be advantageously used in the present invention. M1 may be used to store, for example, critical operating system files, user data and applications, interim results of calculations, etc. The many uses of computer memory are well understood by those skilled in the art, and will not be discussed further here. One may refer to several of the aforementioned patents and applications incorporated by reference, in addition to other references, for a discussion of existing computer architectures and uses of computer memory. Also part of system 100 is user interface 150, which may comprise, for example, a keyboard, mouse or other pointing device, microphone, pen pad, etc. Any device or method capable of inputting commands and/or data from a user 160 to computer system 100 may be used to advantage. A video processor 170 is used to format information for display and transmit the display information to a video display device 180, which is viewed by user 160. Video processor 170 typically includes an associated video memory area, which may be dedicated to the video processor, or shared with other resources. It is understood in the art that the video processor 170 may be part of processor P1 120, in that it may be integrated onto the microprocessor chip. Video processor 170 may also comprise a processor IC located on a video graphics card, which is communicatively coupled to a computer motherboard. Additionally, video processor 170 may comprise circuitry located on the computer motherboard. Further still, functions of video processor 170 may be split between the processor, motherboard, or separate video graphics card.
It is often desirable to connect computer system 100 to a network of one or more computer devices 195, such as the Internet, a LAN, WAN, VPN, etc. This connection may be accomplished via network interface device 190, which may comprise, for example, a telephone modem, a cable modem, a DSL line, a router, gateway, hub, etc. Any device capable of interfacing with the network 195 may be used, via a wired connection, a wireless connection, or an optical connection, for example. Network interface device 190 may connect to network 195 through one or more additional network interface devices (not shown). For example, network interface device 190 may comprise a gateway or router, connected to a cable modem, with the cable modem connected to network 195. Of course, other configurations are within the spirit and scope of the present teachings.
In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, network 195 is isolated from the first processor 120 and memory 110 by a second processor 140 (P2). Second processor 140 may comprise any electronic data processor, such as the devices previously described as applicable to first processor 120. Communicatively coupled to P2 140 is second memory and data storage area 130 (M2), which may comprise any memory device or devices, such as the devices previously described as applicable to first memory 110.
The architecture of computer system 100 is designed to be capable of protecting memory 110 from malware initiated intrusions, and preventing malware from initiating unwanted processes on first processor 120. This is accomplished by using second processor 140 to isolate 110 and 120 from network 195. In a preferred embodiment, P2 140 is communicatively coupled to memory storage area M2 130, and may be configured such that P2 140 is incapable of initiating access to memory storage area M1 110. For example, P2 140 may be capable of accessing memory storage area M1 110 with the strict permission of user 160, either through a real time interaction or via stored configuration or commands. Such a configuration may be desirable in a multi-core or multi processor system, where user 160 may wish to use P2 140 in either a protected mode or an unprotected mode, depending on the application. However, user 160 is capable of denying P2 140 the capability of initiating access to memory storage area M1 110 without the user's permission. P1 120 is communicatively coupled to both memory areas M1 110 and M2 130, thereby enabling P1 120 to access data downloaded from the network 195. In the presently described embodiment, any malware that has intruded the 130-140 system is thus confined to the 130-140 system, and may be configured to be incapable of automatically corrupting data contained on M1 110, or of automatically initiating an unwanted process on P1 120.
This and other features of the present teachings may be illustrated with reference to the example process flow 200 of
In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, if any malware is downloaded from network 195, it is stored in memory 130, and/or run as a process on second processor 140. In the configuration of computer system 100, any downloaded malware is rendered incapable of self initiating access to memory 110 or first processor 120, because second processor 140 is rendered incapable of initiating access to 110 and 120 without a direct or stored command from user 160. Any malware infection is thus confined. If a malware attack corrupts files and/or disrupts the operation of the 130-140 system, the user may easily shut down the corrupted process and restore the corrupted files from a protected image stored on memory 110, for example.
In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the operating system controlling the 110-120 system may be different from an operating system controlling the protected 130-140 system. Conversely, a common operating system may control both the 110-120 system and the protected 130-140 system.
A user 160 may find it desirable to transfer files from the protected 130-140 system to the 110-120 system. User 160 may find it necessary, for example, to transfer an attachment from an e-mail message stored on memory 130 to the 110-120 system for further processing, modification, etc. In this case, the computer system 100 may go through a process whereby a file or other data is transferred from the 130-140 system to the 110-120 system, exemplified by the process 300 illustrated in
In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, at step 310, user 160 selects one or more data files to download from network 195. The desired data is downloaded to the 130-140 system at step 320. The user 160 then directs computer system 100 to move the desired file(s) from the 130-140 system to the 110-120 system at step 330. P1 120 may then perform a malware scan on the desired files, either in real time as the data is being transferred, or while the data still resides in M2 130 (step 340). Alternatively, P2 140 may perform the malware scan. At step 350, processor P2 140 (or P1 120) determines if malware has been detected in the desired file(s), and thus P1 120 makes a decision. If no malware is detected, the file(s) are moved or copied onto M2 110 at step 360. If malware is detected, the data file(s) are quarantined on M2 130, and the data file(s), if transferred to M1 100, are erased or quarantined. Once malware is detected, the user 160 may be alerted of the detection (step 370). Either as a result of user input or stored configuration commands, the infected file(s) are deleted, cleaned, or quarantined on M2 130, at step 380.
The user 160 would of course understand the dangers inherent in transferring downloaded files from the 130-140 system to the 110-120 system. For example, the user's anti-malware software may not be up to date, or may simply be unable to detect certain types of malware. Also, the malware itself may be so new that the user's anti-malware definitions have not been updated as yet. Therefore the user may wish to keep the files on the 130-140 system for some period of time. Consequently, it may be desirable to have resident on the 130-140 system a variety of application software such as readers, thereby allowing the user to examine the files without risking transferring the files to the 110-120 system. These reader programs, such as Adobe Acrobat Reader, by the Adobe Systems Corporation, or Visio reader, by the Microsoft Corporation, are typically subset application programs of the full featured application programs, and may thus require far less memory space than the full application. Additionally, software companies often distribute the reader programs for free (or a nominal fee), thereby providing advertising for the full featured application in the hopes that it will be eventually purchased by the user. This reader application may be opened and executed on the 130-140 system in a manner similar to the process described in
In the event the 130-140 system becomes infected with malware, the user 160 may wish to clean the 130-140 system. This cleaning may be accomplished by running an anti-malware application on the 130-140 system. However, if the infection is too severe for the anti-malware software to clean, or if the malware is undetectable by the user's anti-malware software, the user may wish to restore critical system files (or other user data files) for the 130-140 system from a protected image stored on M1 100, for example. It is of course understood that the critical system file image may be restored from another device, such as a removable drive or a CD, for example. The user may however consider it more convenient to restore the critical system files from an image on M1 100.
In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, an exemplary process for restoring M2 130 from M1 110 is illustrated by process 400 in
In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, a user 160 may consider it advantageous for the 130-140 system to be automatically reinitialized from clean critical system files when a protected process window is opened. In this way, the new protected process is much less likely to be affected by an infection from a previous protected process session. Of course, a user may have a plurality of protected processes open and running during a protected process session. It may only be necessary to automatically reinitialize from clean critical system files when the first protected process is opened during a session. Subsequent protected processes may not require automatic re-initialization from clean critical system files. An exemplary automatic re-initialization from clean critical system files is illustrated by steps 510, 520 and 530 in
In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, a user 160 may consider it advantageous for the 130-140 system to be automatically cleaned when a protected process window is closed. In this way, any detected or undetected malware infections are much less likely to affect a future protected process session. It may only be necessary to automatically clean the 130-140 system when the last protected process is closed during a session. An exemplary automatic cleaning process is illustrated by steps 540, 550, 560, 570 and 580 in
Interactive network processes such as interactive gaming have become very popular in recent years. In current interactive gaming processes, a user may log onto a game host located on network 195, or connect to other computers whose users wish to participate in the game. Computer games, such as Quake 3. Arena, by Id Software Incorporated, or Call of Duty, by Activision Incorporated, are just two examples of the plethora of games available that may be played interactively over a network. The user's computer system typically provides the bulk of the processing power and video graphics generation required to display the often fast moving and richly detailed three dimensional game environments. Information about the current and new state of the game is exchanged between various users' computer systems, often in real time. With this type of process, a relatively modest amount of data is required to be exchanged between users, or a user and the host, with the bulk of the processing, data manipulation, and graphics generation being handled by the user's local machine. However, this open network connection may become a conduit for malware practitioners to exploit, allowing malware to be downloaded onto a user's computer during a gaming session, often without the user being aware of the malware transfer. It would be advantageous, therefore, for a computer system to be much less susceptible to malware attacks during gaming sessions.
In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, an exemplary process flow 600, illustrated in
By using exemplary process 600 (or an equivalent), computer system 100 is capable of actively deciding what data to download and use, and what data to discard or scan for malware. The game status data is buffered prior to loading it onto the 110-120 system. The 110-120 system may be advantageously configured to only accept game status information in the proper format, thereby minimizing the chance that a malware practitioner could deceptively load malware onto the 110-120 system.
Additionally, computer system 100 could be configured such that system 130-140 is powerful enough to process the interactive network process without exchanging information with the 110-120 system. Such a configuration may be more secure, as a conduit between the 110-120 system and the 130-140 system may not be necessarily opened. The 130-140 system may contain all the necessary files to facilitate the interactive network process. Higher end computers, workstations, and servers often contain dual (or more) processors, such as the Mac G5, manufactured by the Apple Computer Corporation, or a single physical processor with a multiple processor core. Often, the processors in these multi-processor machines are of equal or comparable processing power. In such a configuration, one processor may be dedicated to performing functions equivalent to those described for P1 120, with a second processor performing the functions equivalent to those described for P2 140. A computer system 100 employing multiple processors may be advantageously configured such that one of the processors is dedicated to protected processes only when a network process is active. When a user is not accessing a network, the multiple processors in a computer system may be dedicated to other processes, such as performing complex calculations or simulations, or running complex non-network interactive gaming processes, for example. Alternatively, the computer system 100 may be configured such that the 110-120 system simply transfers required files to the video processor 170 or the 130-140 system at the appropriate time to facilitate the interactive network process. The 110-120 system could be commanded to retrieve and transfer the files at the command of the video processor, or at the command of the 130-140 system, or a combination of both.
In accordance with embodiments of the present invention, computer system 100 may be configured in a variety of ways, while still remaining within the spirit and scope of the present teachings. One such exemplary embodiment is illustrated in
In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, an alternate configuration for computer system 100 is illustrated in
In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, an alternate configuration for computer system 100 is illustrated in
Referring again to
Some malware programs are designed to secretly record user input commands (such as keystrokes, for example), then send the information back to a host computer. This type of malware is capable of stealing important user information, such as passwords, bank account numbers, social security numbers, driver's license numbers, credit account numbers, etc. Theft of such personal information could result in the theft of actual assets (money or securities, etc.) or perhaps used for identity theft, among other malicious intents. Clearly, a computer system capable of ensuring the protection of such sensitive information would be desirable.
In accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, a computer system is configured such that attempts by malware to record and report data entry by the computer user via input devices such as keyboards, mouse clicks, microphones, or any other data input devices are effectively blocked. Encryption of user input data, such as keystrokes, is an effective means of protecting such data from theft by malware. Specific techniques used for data encryption and decryption are well known in the art, and need not be discussed further here. There are many examples in the art that may be examined to better understand various encryption/decryption techniques and the use of encryption/decryption in computer systems. Among these are U.S. Pat. No. 6,581,162 entitled “Method for securely creating, storing and using encryption keys in a computer system.” issued to Angelo, et al., and U.S. Pat. No. 6,134,661 entitled “Computer network security device and method.” Issued to Topp. The aforementioned patents have been previously incorporated by reference.
In accordance with the present teachings, a method of operating a computer system involving data encryption is described. In step 1010, a user opens a protected process where some level of data encryption is desired, for example, the encryption of sensitive user interface data or user files. Other data may be encrypted as desired. At step 1020, processor P1 120 instructs processor P2 140 to initiate a protected process and open a process window. P1 120 encrypts the sensitive data and passes the user interface data to P2 140 when a P2 140 window is selected or active (step 1030). P2 140 generates video data for the P2 140 process window(s) and passes the video data to video processor 170 (step 1040). Video processor 170 decrypts the sensitive data and interleaves the video data from all P1 and P2 processes (step 1050). P2 140 passes the encrypted sensitive data to network interface device 190 (step 1060). Network interface device 190 decrypts the sensitive data and passes the decrypted sensitive data to network 195. Of course, other methods of operating a computer system in which data is encrypted prior to being passed to P2 140, and decrypted after leaving the control of P2 140, are within the spirit and scope of the present teachings.
In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, data desired to be protected is encrypted prior to sending the data to processor P2 140, which may be running one or more malware processes. Processor P2 140 does not have visibility to the decryption keys, and is therefore unable to decrypt the data. Data may be decrypted by network interface device 190 prior to forwarding the data on to network 195. Conversely, encrypted data may be sent directly over the network for decryption by another computer system, including, for example, an interne banking host computer. Decryption keys may be passed between P1 120 and network interface device 190 via a communication link 191. Video processor 170 may decrypt the data prior to displaying the data on video display 180, with decryption keys possibly passed between P1 120 and video processor 170 via a communication link 171. Conversely, data may be passed directly to video processor 170 via a communication link 151.
A user 160 may wish to encrypt just a portion of the data destined for the network, such as passwords, credit card numbers, etc. Conversely, a user may wish to encrypt large blocks of data, such as e-mails or large application files containing sensitive text and/or graphics. Instructions may be passed to network interface device 190 directing 190 to decrypt one or more specific data blocks prior to sending the data blocks to network 195. Conversely, instructions may be passed to network interface device 190 directing 190 to pass one or more specific data blocks to network 195 without decryption.
While this invention has been described with reference to illustrative embodiments, this description is not intended to be construed in a limiting sense. Various modifications and combinations of the illustrative embodiments, as well as other embodiments of the invention, will be apparent to persons skilled in the art upon reference to the description. It is therefore intended that the appended claims encompass any such modifications or embodiments.
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|Citing Patent||Filing date||Publication date||Applicant||Title|
|US8938796||13 Sep 2013||20 Jan 2015||Paul Case, SR.||Case secure computer architecture|
|US9122633||13 Jan 2015||1 Sep 2015||Paul Case, SR.||Case secure computer architecture|
|US9342695||17 Oct 2014||17 May 2016||Mordecai Barkan||Secured automated or semi-automated systems|
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|U.S. Classification||713/152, 726/22, 726/23, 713/151, 713/188, 726/24|
|International Classification||G06F11/00, G06F12/16, G08B23/00, G06F12/14, H04L29/06|
|Cooperative Classification||H04L63/02, H04L63/1408, G06F21/53, G06F21/568, G06F21/57|
|European Classification||H04L63/14A, G06F21/56E, G06F21/57, G06F21/53, H04L63/02|
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