US9600661B2 - System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium - Google Patents
System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US9600661B2 US9600661B2 US11/292,910 US29291005A US9600661B2 US 9600661 B2 US9600661 B2 US 9600661B2 US 29291005 A US29291005 A US 29291005A US 9600661 B2 US9600661 B2 US 9600661B2
- Authority
- US
- United States
- Prior art keywords
- application
- computer
- database
- write access
- write
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active - Reinstated, expires
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/52—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method of controlling the writing of data to a storage medium such as a hard drive in a computer system by an application running in a memory of the computer system.
- the present invention seeks to provide an improved method of preventing the infection of a computer by a virus program.
- a method of controlling write access to a storage medium by monitoring an application detecting an attempt by the application to write data to said storage medium; interrogating a rules database in response to said detection; and controlling write access to the storage medium by the application in dependence on said interrogation.
- FIG. 1 is a process diagram showing the control of a write instruction of an application in accordance with a preferred method of the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a process diagram illustrating an action of the preferred method according to the present invention.
- FIG. 3 is a flow diagram of the preferred method.
- the interrogation comprises determining the write access allowed for the application and controlling the write access in dependence thereon.
- write access is controlled to one of a plurality of levels, the levels including a first level in which no write access is allowed, a second level in which full write access is allowed, and a third level in which write access is only allowed for at least one specified file extension.
- the method further includes generating a prompt on a display requesting response from a user.
- the user can respond to the prompt by choosing from a number of possible responses, the possible responses including a first response for allowing write access, a second response for blocking write access and a third response for allowing write access to a specific file type only.
- the user can respond further by selecting from a plurality of further actions, the further actions including, storing the chosen response in the rules database; and applying the chosen response only for the current attempt by the application to write data to said storage medium.
- FIG. 1 this shows an application 12 which is running in a memory 14 of a computer system.
- the computer system also has a storage medium 16 which here is in the form of a hard drive or disc.
- the typical computer is comprised of a central processing unit, a main memory, a mass storage device and input and output connections.
- the input and output include keyboards, monitors and network connections.
- the mass storage device can be a magnetic disk, optical disk or a large array of semiconductor devices.
- the main memory is typically an array of semiconductor circuits.
- the central processing unit is operatively connected to these components so that it can both control their activities and move data among the components.
- the central processing unit can load data off of the mass storage device and write it into main memory. This data can either be treated as a program or as data to be processed. If a program, the central processing unit passes control to the program data and executes the instructions encoded in the data.
- Program data can be an application servicing the user.
- an application 18 which is here termed as an “interceptor” program.
- This runs constantly in the background.
- the interceptor program can run continuously in the background as a process, including as part of the computer operating system.
- the interceptor program 18 detects this and interrogates a rules database 20 to determine the authority of the application 12 to write to the hard drive 16 .
- the database 20 is preferably encrypted and lists applications approved by the user with their level of write access. Practitioners of ordinary skill will recognize that the rule database is a set of entries or references in a data structure where the identity of an application is paired with one or more permission values, which encode the write access levels. A rule is therefore one or more permission values associated with an application.
- a rule can also include the signature of the application, which is used in embodiments where the application code is checked to be sure it has not been tampered with.
- a rule that is transmitted to a computer for updating the database will preferably include a reference to the application, which may be the name of the application, and the associated permission values for the permitted or denied write access levels, and may include the associated signature.
- data is used here in its general sense to include any form of data including programs.
- Level 0 this means that no write access to the hard drive 16 is allowed for the application 12 .
- Level 1 this means that full write access is allowed.
- Level 2 the application is allowed write access to the hard drive 16 for specified file extensions only, (for example “.doc” file extensions for document files in Microsoft OfficeTM) file extensions of data that can be written to the hard drive are also held in the database 20 .
- Level 4 The application can be granted to have access to a specific drive or directory.
- the database can contain corresponding references between applications and file types or file extensions that such application may write.
- manager program 22 which can sit in the memory 14 alongside the interceptor program 18 and can also be run on start up of the computer or at any preferred time during operation of the interceptor program 18 , running continuously in the background, including as part of the computer operating system.
- FIG. 2 illustrates the interface of the manager program 22 with the rules database 20 and the system user.
- the interceptor program 18 When the interceptor program 18 detects that the application 12 is attempting to write to the hard drive 16 it initiates the loading and execution of the manager program 22 .
- the latter interrogates the rules database 20 to determine the access level of the application 12 and controls the interceptor program 18 to allow or prevent the write action in dependence on the relevant rule in the rules database 20 . If the application 12 is not listed in the rules database 20 or the particular write instruction is not allowed, the manager program 22 can generate a prompt signal to be displayed on the computer screen, requiring the user to make a decision on whether or not to allow the write instruction.
- This prompt can have a number of responses for the user to choose, such as “Allow write access”, “Block write access” and “Allow write access to this file type only”. Having chosen the response the user can also select one of a number of further actions as follows.
- the rules database 20 can be updated such that all future attempts by the application 12 to write files of that same extension to the hard drive 16 would be automatically allowed or prevented or result in further user prompts.
- the privilege to write to the hard drive is distinct from the privilege to write to a directory.
- the former can be independent of the latter, that is, an application can have the privilege to write to the hard drive, independently of what directory the write is to occur in.
- the rules database comprising privilege levels can contain a privilege entry associated with an application whose value is independent of the directory the application is seeking to write to.
- determining the “file extension” also includes detecting the actual type of file by examination of its contents, especially in the case where internally such file is an executable.
- Windows XP in a Nutshell, Second Edition, ⁇ 2005, O'Reilly Media, U.S.A.
- Microsoft Windows Internals 4th Edition: Microsoft Windows Server 2003, Windows XP, and Windows 2000, Mark E. Russinovich, David A. Solomon, Microsoft Press, Hardcover, 4th edition, Published December 2004, 935 pages, ISBN 0735619174.
- the manager program 22 can also be loaded and executed by the user at start up of the computer or at any time in order to scan the hard drive 16 for programs to build a full rules database 20 .
- the manager program 22 can also be prompted by the user to display a list of programs within the rules database 20 with the access level of each program, giving the user the option to delete, add or modify each entry.
- a rules database can be pre-created, or incrementally improved and distributed to the computer electronically, either embodied on a disk or electronically over a data network. Rules determined by users can also be uploaded to a central depository as well. Rule updates can be downloaded into the computer. Rules can also be included with installation files for the particular application that the installation file is creating.
- the installation process has to be sufficiently certified that program installation does not corrupt the database by incorporating bogus rules that service virus writers.
- Certification can include digital signing protocols between the invention and the installing program and other modes of verifying authenticity, including remotely accessed keys or trusted third parties accessed over a network. Rules can also be derived by examining operating system data where such data presents correspondences between installed program applications and file types and extensions. In this case, other authentication may be necessary in order to avoid virus writers from inserting bogus file type associations within the operating system databases. Practitioners of ordinary skill will recognize that authentication can include cyclic redundancy checking (CRC) and other types of numerical algorithms that detect when tampering has occurred.
- CRC cyclic redundancy checking
- FIG. 3 a flow diagram 30 is shown which illustrates the method followed on initiation 32 of the interceptor program 18 .
- the interceptor module is a kernel mode driver which has a higher level of access to the Windows file system and system resources.
- the interceptor program 18 waits in a monitoring step 34 during which it monitors for any file write operation to the hard drive 16 . In the absence of a file write operation, the interceptor program. 18 remains in the monitoring step 34 and continues to check for a file write operation.
- the interceptor program 18 proceeds to complete a series of rule checking steps 36 by calling a kernel mode rules checker. Initially the rules checker checks if the application 12 making the write attempt is listed in the rules database 20 .
- the rules database can be stored on the local personal computer, client computer or remote server. In the preferred embodiment, a recent list of rules that have been interrogated may also be held in a cache in kernel memory cache which speeds up applications that are frequently accessing the drive. If the application 12 is not listed then the interceptor program 18 initiates the manager program 22 to allow the user to make a decision about the correct way in which to proceed. Otherwise, if the application 12 is listed then the interceptor program 18 proceeds to the next rule checking step.
- the interceptor program 18 goes on to check if the write privileges of the application 12 . Initially the hard drive write privilege of the application 12 is checked. If the application 12 does not have privilege to write to the hard drive then write access is blocked. Otherwise, the interceptor program 18 checks if the application 12 has write privilege for the specific file type, directory or filename which the write attempt has been made to. The manager program can, at this step, check the data to be written or the file to which such data is being appended to determine if the contents of the file are the appropriate file type, that is, to avoid improper creation of portable executable (PE) or other files whose contents are intended to be used as computer program code. PE files are files that are portable across all Microsoft 32-bit operating systems.
- the same PE-format file can be executed on any version of Windows 95, 98, Me, NT, and 2000. This is supplemental to checking the file extension in order to avoid the virus propagation technique described above. If the application 12 does have privilege to write to the specific detected file type or file extension then the write operation is allowed. Otherwise write access is blocked.
- a signature of the application which is a number that is calculated to determine whether a code block has been tampered with, is also stored in the rules database. Practitioners of ordinary skill will recognize that CRC, or cyclic redundancy checks or other types of signature checking, for example, MD5 may be used. Reference is made to “Applied Cryptography” by Bruce Schneier, John Wiley & Sons, 1996, ISBN 0-471-11709-9.
- a prompt module can ask the user what access level or permission they wish to allow for the application. This can involve denying or blocking the application write for that instant or for ever.
- the user can also get information from other users responses to a specific application by data being downloaded from a central server over a data network, both a proprietary network as well as the Internet.
- the system also allows feedback on the users responses to write requests to be uploaded and stored on a central server. This stores if the user allowed or denied the application write, or what level of permission was applied and if it was denied, the reason why.
- the reason the user denied it can be a number of responses such as ‘virus’, ‘Trojan’ etc.
- the applications name and signature are stored with the reason.
Abstract
Description
Level 4—The application can be granted to have access to a specific drive or directory. The database can contain corresponding references between applications and file types or file extensions that such application may write.
- 1 Store the response in the rules database—The response is stored in the rules database as a further rule to be applied to that application on all future write actions.
- 2 Block once the write action—This prevents the requested write action for this occasion only and further write attempts by the application again result in a user prompt.
- 3 Allow once the write action—This allows the requested write action but any future write requests for the application again result in a user prompt.
Claims (58)
Priority Applications (7)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US11/292,910 US9600661B2 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2005-12-01 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
US11/858,752 US7664924B2 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2007-09-20 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
US12/646,685 US20100153671A1 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2009-12-23 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
US15/421,984 US10503418B2 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2017-02-01 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
US16/561,855 US11073994B2 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2019-09-05 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
US17/350,765 US11449243B2 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2021-06-17 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
US17/819,850 US11886716B2 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2022-08-15 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US11/292,910 US9600661B2 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2005-12-01 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
Related Parent Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US11/858,752 Continuation US7664924B2 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2007-09-20 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
Related Child Applications (4)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US11/858,752 Continuation US7664924B2 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2007-09-20 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
US11/858,752 Continuation-In-Part US7664924B2 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2007-09-20 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
US12/646,685 Continuation-In-Part US20100153671A1 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2009-12-23 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
US15/421,984 Continuation US10503418B2 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2017-02-01 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
US20070130433A1 US20070130433A1 (en) | 2007-06-07 |
US9600661B2 true US9600661B2 (en) | 2017-03-21 |
Family
ID=38120153
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US11/292,910 Active - Reinstated 2027-04-18 US9600661B2 (en) | 2005-12-01 | 2005-12-01 | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium |
Country Status (1)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US9600661B2 (en) |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20170024560A1 (en) * | 2015-07-24 | 2017-01-26 | Citrix Systems, Inc. | Blocking Routine Redirection |
US20230247061A1 (en) * | 2022-02-01 | 2023-08-03 | Capital One Services, Llc | Updating security rule sets using repository switching |
Families Citing this family (14)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20080276302A1 (en) | 2005-12-13 | 2008-11-06 | Yoggie Security Systems Ltd. | System and Method for Providing Data and Device Security Between External and Host Devices |
US8381297B2 (en) | 2005-12-13 | 2013-02-19 | Yoggie Security Systems Ltd. | System and method for providing network security to mobile devices |
US8869270B2 (en) | 2008-03-26 | 2014-10-21 | Cupp Computing As | System and method for implementing content and network security inside a chip |
US20070152136A1 (en) * | 2006-01-04 | 2007-07-05 | Jianquo Yao | Transimpedance amplifier protection circuits |
US8117441B2 (en) * | 2006-06-20 | 2012-02-14 | Microsoft Corporation | Integrating security protection tools with computer device integrity and privacy policy |
US20080016077A1 (en) * | 2006-07-11 | 2008-01-17 | International Business Machines Corporation | A system for ensuring that only one computer application maintains edit or delete access to a file at all times |
US8365272B2 (en) | 2007-05-30 | 2013-01-29 | Yoggie Security Systems Ltd. | System and method for providing network and computer firewall protection with dynamic address isolation to a device |
US8631488B2 (en) | 2008-08-04 | 2014-01-14 | Cupp Computing As | Systems and methods for providing security services during power management mode |
WO2010059864A1 (en) | 2008-11-19 | 2010-05-27 | Yoggie Security Systems Ltd. | Systems and methods for providing real time access monitoring of a removable media device |
US20130227711A1 (en) * | 2012-02-29 | 2013-08-29 | Smith Micro Software, Inc. | Controlled Access by Applications to Mobile Device Resources |
US9973501B2 (en) | 2012-10-09 | 2018-05-15 | Cupp Computing As | Transaction security systems and methods |
US11157976B2 (en) | 2013-07-08 | 2021-10-26 | Cupp Computing As | Systems and methods for providing digital content marketplace security |
US9762614B2 (en) | 2014-02-13 | 2017-09-12 | Cupp Computing As | Systems and methods for providing network security using a secure digital device |
KR20180060804A (en) * | 2016-11-29 | 2018-06-07 | 삼성전자주식회사 | Electronic apparatus, control method of electronic apparatus, and recording media |
Citations (22)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1993009498A1 (en) | 1991-10-28 | 1993-05-13 | Sung Moo Yang | Method and system protecting data in storage device against computer viruses |
JPH0844630A (en) | 1994-08-03 | 1996-02-16 | Nri & Ncc Co Ltd | Device for controlling file access and method thereof |
US5825877A (en) | 1996-06-11 | 1998-10-20 | International Business Machines Corporation | Support for portable trusted software |
WO1998050843A1 (en) | 1997-05-02 | 1998-11-12 | Network Associates, Inc. | Process-level data security system |
KR200144706Y1 (en) | 1996-04-25 | 1999-06-15 | 구자홍 | motor |
US5974549A (en) * | 1997-03-27 | 1999-10-26 | Soliton Ltd. | Security monitor |
US20010011323A1 (en) * | 2000-01-28 | 2001-08-02 | Yoshiyuki Ohta | Read/write processing device and method for a disk medium |
US6308274B1 (en) | 1998-06-12 | 2001-10-23 | Microsoft Corporation | Least privilege via restricted tokens |
US20020073072A1 (en) | 2000-12-13 | 2002-06-13 | Keiji Fukumoto | Method of controlling access to database, database device, method of controlling access to resource, information processing device, program, and storage medium for the program |
US20020174102A1 (en) * | 2001-04-27 | 2002-11-21 | Kyler Daniel B. | Filter driver for identifying disk files by analysis of content |
WO2003017682A2 (en) | 2001-08-13 | 2003-02-27 | Qualcomm, Incorporated | Application level access privilege to a storage area on a computer device |
US20030051169A1 (en) * | 2001-08-13 | 2003-03-13 | Sprigg Stephen A. | Using permissions to allocate device resources to an application |
US20030188231A1 (en) * | 2002-04-01 | 2003-10-02 | Cronce Paul A. | Method for runtime code integrity validation using code block checksums |
US20040019807A1 (en) * | 2002-05-15 | 2004-01-29 | Zone Labs, Inc. | System And Methodology For Providing Community-Based Security Policies |
US20040168070A1 (en) * | 2003-02-21 | 2004-08-26 | Symantec Corporation | Safe memory scanning |
GB2402515A (en) * | 2003-05-20 | 2004-12-08 | Catherine Safa | Controlling write access of an application to a storage medium |
US20050091501A1 (en) * | 2002-01-18 | 2005-04-28 | Harro Osthoff | Loading data into a mobile terminal |
US6922781B1 (en) * | 1999-04-30 | 2005-07-26 | Ideaflood, Inc. | Method and apparatus for identifying and characterizing errant electronic files |
US6941470B1 (en) | 2000-04-07 | 2005-09-06 | Everdream Corporation | Protected execution environments within a computer system |
US6978366B1 (en) * | 1999-11-01 | 2005-12-20 | International Business Machines Corporation | Secure document management system |
US20060075492A1 (en) * | 2004-10-01 | 2006-04-06 | Microsoft Corporation | Access authorization with anomaly detection |
US7681237B1 (en) * | 2004-05-13 | 2010-03-16 | Symantec Corporation | Semi-synchronous scanning of modified files in real time |
-
2005
- 2005-12-01 US US11/292,910 patent/US9600661B2/en active Active - Reinstated
Patent Citations (23)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1993009498A1 (en) | 1991-10-28 | 1993-05-13 | Sung Moo Yang | Method and system protecting data in storage device against computer viruses |
JPH0844630A (en) | 1994-08-03 | 1996-02-16 | Nri & Ncc Co Ltd | Device for controlling file access and method thereof |
KR200144706Y1 (en) | 1996-04-25 | 1999-06-15 | 구자홍 | motor |
US5825877A (en) | 1996-06-11 | 1998-10-20 | International Business Machines Corporation | Support for portable trusted software |
US5974549A (en) * | 1997-03-27 | 1999-10-26 | Soliton Ltd. | Security monitor |
WO1998050843A1 (en) | 1997-05-02 | 1998-11-12 | Network Associates, Inc. | Process-level data security system |
US6308274B1 (en) | 1998-06-12 | 2001-10-23 | Microsoft Corporation | Least privilege via restricted tokens |
US6922781B1 (en) * | 1999-04-30 | 2005-07-26 | Ideaflood, Inc. | Method and apparatus for identifying and characterizing errant electronic files |
US6978366B1 (en) * | 1999-11-01 | 2005-12-20 | International Business Machines Corporation | Secure document management system |
US20010011323A1 (en) * | 2000-01-28 | 2001-08-02 | Yoshiyuki Ohta | Read/write processing device and method for a disk medium |
US6941470B1 (en) | 2000-04-07 | 2005-09-06 | Everdream Corporation | Protected execution environments within a computer system |
US20020073072A1 (en) | 2000-12-13 | 2002-06-13 | Keiji Fukumoto | Method of controlling access to database, database device, method of controlling access to resource, information processing device, program, and storage medium for the program |
US20020174102A1 (en) * | 2001-04-27 | 2002-11-21 | Kyler Daniel B. | Filter driver for identifying disk files by analysis of content |
WO2003017682A2 (en) | 2001-08-13 | 2003-02-27 | Qualcomm, Incorporated | Application level access privilege to a storage area on a computer device |
US20030061504A1 (en) * | 2001-08-13 | 2003-03-27 | Sprigg Stephen A. | Application level access privilege to a storage area on a computer device |
US20030051169A1 (en) * | 2001-08-13 | 2003-03-13 | Sprigg Stephen A. | Using permissions to allocate device resources to an application |
US20050091501A1 (en) * | 2002-01-18 | 2005-04-28 | Harro Osthoff | Loading data into a mobile terminal |
US20030188231A1 (en) * | 2002-04-01 | 2003-10-02 | Cronce Paul A. | Method for runtime code integrity validation using code block checksums |
US20040019807A1 (en) * | 2002-05-15 | 2004-01-29 | Zone Labs, Inc. | System And Methodology For Providing Community-Based Security Policies |
US20040168070A1 (en) * | 2003-02-21 | 2004-08-26 | Symantec Corporation | Safe memory scanning |
GB2402515A (en) * | 2003-05-20 | 2004-12-08 | Catherine Safa | Controlling write access of an application to a storage medium |
US7681237B1 (en) * | 2004-05-13 | 2010-03-16 | Symantec Corporation | Semi-synchronous scanning of modified files in real time |
US20060075492A1 (en) * | 2004-10-01 | 2006-04-06 | Microsoft Corporation | Access authorization with anomaly detection |
Non-Patent Citations (8)
Title |
---|
Dekart. Dekart Private Disk 2.06-Protect your data, application by application!. [online], [retrieved on Oct. 18, 2012]. Retrieved from the Internet <URL: https://www.dekart.com/en/nc/news/news-archive/disk-encryption-firewall/2005/november/>. * |
Dekart. Dekart Private Disk SDK Makes Your Applications Stand Out from Competitors' Product with Strong Certified Encryption and Exclusive Access. [online], [retrieved on Oct. 18, 2012]. Retrieved from the Internet . * |
Dekart. Dekart Private Disk SDK Makes Your Applications Stand Out from Competitors' Product with Strong Certified Encryption and Exclusive Access. [online], [retrieved on Oct. 18, 2012]. Retrieved from the Internet <URL: http://www.dekart.com/nc/news/news-archive/-848b91ff75/2005/august/>. * |
FileMerlin?. Conversion Library and API for Developers [online]. Advanced Computer Innovations, Inc., 2004 [retrieved on Jan. 28, 2008]. Retrieved from the Internet: . * |
FileMerlin?. Conversion Library and API for Developers [online]. Advanced Computer Innovations, Inc., 2004 [retrieved on Jan. 28, 2008]. Retrieved from the Internet: <URL:http://web.archive.org/web/20040810113019/file-convert.com/fmdvref.htm>. * |
Norton Internet Security 2000. Manual [online]. Symantec Corporation, 1999 [retrieved on Jan. 29, 2008]. Retrieved from the Internet: . * |
Norton Internet Security 2000. Manual [online]. Symantec Corporation, 1999 [retrieved on Jan. 29, 2008]. Retrieved from the Internet: <URL:http://webpages.charter.net/cwind/nis.pdf>. * |
Peter Szor, The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense, Section 11.12, Addison Wesley Professional, Feb. 3, 2005, New York, ISBN 0-321-30454-3. |
Cited By (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20170024560A1 (en) * | 2015-07-24 | 2017-01-26 | Citrix Systems, Inc. | Blocking Routine Redirection |
US10181030B2 (en) * | 2015-07-24 | 2019-01-15 | Citrix Systems, Inc. | Blocking routine redirection |
US11017081B2 (en) | 2015-07-24 | 2021-05-25 | Citrix Systems, Inc. | Blocking routine redirection |
US20230247061A1 (en) * | 2022-02-01 | 2023-08-03 | Capital One Services, Llc | Updating security rule sets using repository switching |
US11916971B2 (en) * | 2022-02-01 | 2024-02-27 | Capital One Services, Llc | Updating security rule sets using repository switching |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20070130433A1 (en) | 2007-06-07 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US9600661B2 (en) | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium | |
US7664924B2 (en) | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium | |
US20100153671A1 (en) | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium | |
CA2400940C (en) | Controlling access to a resource by a program using a digital signature | |
US7487358B2 (en) | Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis | |
US20060117184A1 (en) | Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis | |
US7890756B2 (en) | Verification system and method for accessing resources in a computing environment | |
JP2010205270A (en) | Device for providing tamper evident property to executable code stored in removable medium | |
EP1817862A2 (en) | Method to control access between network endpoints based on trust scores calculated from information system component analysis | |
US7225461B2 (en) | Method for updating security information, client, server and management computer therefor | |
US10992713B2 (en) | Method of and system for authorizing user to execute action in electronic service | |
US11886716B2 (en) | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium | |
JP2006107505A (en) | Api for access authorization | |
US20080114956A1 (en) | System and method to secure a computer system by selective control of write access to a data storage medium | |
EP3151154B1 (en) | Data access control based on storage validation | |
US20220107834A1 (en) | Task engine | |
US20230198997A1 (en) | Access control systems and methods | |
WO2008036833A2 (en) | Selective control of write access to a data storage medium | |
Lambert | Software Restriction Policies in Windows XP | |
KR20020034862A (en) | A secret value control method of the application in the computer |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: DRIVE SENTRY, INC., CALIFORNIA Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:SAFA, JOHN;REEL/FRAME:022818/0833 Effective date: 20070809 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: STEVENS, RICHARD,UNITED KINGDOM Free format text: SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:DRIVE SENTRY, INC.;REEL/FRAME:024611/0473 Effective date: 20070625 Owner name: STEVENS, RICHARD, UNITED KINGDOM Free format text: SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:DRIVE SENTRY, INC.;REEL/FRAME:024611/0473 Effective date: 20070625 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: DRIVE SENTRY, INC., NEW YORK Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE REMOVE APPLICATION SERIAL NUMBER 11/929,910 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 019673 FRAME 0774. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE ASSIGNMENT;ASSIGNOR:SAFA, JOHN;REEL/FRAME:028573/0820 Effective date: 20070809 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: DRIVE SENTRY LIMITED, UNITED KINGDOM Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:DRIVE SENTRY, INC.;REEL/FRAME:035557/0723 Effective date: 20150407 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: DRIVE SENTRY LIMITED, UNITED KINGDOM Free format text: CHANGE OF ASSIGNEE'S ADDRESS;ASSIGNOR:DRIVE SENTRY LIMITED;REEL/FRAME:041581/0705 Effective date: 20160101 |
|
STCF | Information on status: patent grant |
Free format text: PATENTED CASE |
|
FEPP | Fee payment procedure |
Free format text: MAINTENANCE FEE REMINDER MAILED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: REM.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: EIGHTH STREET SOLUTIONS LLC, TEXAS Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:DRIVE SENTRY LIMITED;REEL/FRAME:054830/0670 Effective date: 20200330 |
|
LAPS | Lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees |
Free format text: PATENT EXPIRED FOR FAILURE TO PAY MAINTENANCE FEES (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: EXP.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY |
|
STCH | Information on status: patent discontinuation |
Free format text: PATENT EXPIRED DUE TO NONPAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEES UNDER 37 CFR 1.362 |
|
FEPP | Fee payment procedure |
Free format text: SURCHARGE, PETITION TO ACCEPT PYMT AFTER EXP, UNINTENTIONAL. (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M2558); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY Free format text: PETITION RELATED TO MAINTENANCE FEES GRANTED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: PMFG); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY Free format text: PETITION RELATED TO MAINTENANCE FEES FILED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: PMFP); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY |
|
MAFP | Maintenance fee payment |
Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 4TH YR, SMALL ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M2551); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY Year of fee payment: 4 |
|
STCF | Information on status: patent grant |
Free format text: PATENTED CASE |
|
FP | Lapsed due to failure to pay maintenance fee |
Effective date: 20210321 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: DRIVE SENTRY LIMITED, UNITED KINGDOM Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:EIGHTH STREET SOLUTIONS LLC;REEL/FRAME:062673/0020 Effective date: 20230130 |