CA2308170A1 - Masked digital signatures - Google Patents
Masked digital signatures Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CA2308170A1 CA2308170A1 CA002308170A CA2308170A CA2308170A1 CA 2308170 A1 CA2308170 A1 CA 2308170A1 CA 002308170 A CA002308170 A CA 002308170A CA 2308170 A CA2308170 A CA 2308170A CA 2308170 A1 CA2308170 A1 CA 2308170A1
- Authority
- CA
- Canada
- Prior art keywords
- signature
- short term
- computing
- private key
- component
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract 11
- 230000007774 longterm Effects 0.000 claims 4
- 238000007620 mathematical function Methods 0.000 abstract 2
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 abstract 1
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
- H04L9/3252—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using DSA or related signature schemes, e.g. elliptic based signatures, ElGamal or Schnorr schemes
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/04—Masking or blinding
Abstract
The present invention relates to digital signature operations using public key schemes in a secure communications system and in particular for use with processors having limited computing power such as "smart cards". This invention describes a method for creating and authenticating a digital signature comprising the steps of selecting a first session parameter k and generating a first short term public key derived from the session parameter k, computing a first signature component r derived from a first mathematical function using the short term public key, selecting a second session parameter t and computing a second signature component s derived from a second mathematical function using the second session parameter t and without using an inverse operation, computing a third signature component using the first and second session parameters and sending the signature components (r, s, c) as a masked digital signature to a receiver computer system. In the receiver computer system computing a recovered second signature component s' by combining a third signature component with the second signature component to derive signature components ( ~, r) as an unmasked digital signature. Verifying these signature components as in a usual ElGamal or ECDSA type signature verification.
Claims (11)
1. A method of signing and authenticating a message m in a public key data communication system, comprising the steps of:
in a secure computer system;
(a) generating a first short term private key k;
(b) computing a first short teen public key derived from said first short term private key k;
(c) computing a first signature component r by using said first short teen public key k;
(d) generating a second short term private key t;
(e) computing a second signature component s by using said second short term private key t on said message m, said long term private key and said first signature component r;
(f) computing a third signature component c using said first and second short term private keys t and k respectively, and sending said signature components (r, s, c) as a masked digital signature of said message m to a receiver computer system; in said receiver system;
(g) using said second and third signature components (s,c) computing a normal signature component s and sending said signature components (s, r) as a normal digital signature to a receiver verifer computer system; and in said verifier system (h) verifying said normal signature.
in a secure computer system;
(a) generating a first short term private key k;
(b) computing a first short teen public key derived from said first short term private key k;
(c) computing a first signature component r by using said first short teen public key k;
(d) generating a second short term private key t;
(e) computing a second signature component s by using said second short term private key t on said message m, said long term private key and said first signature component r;
(f) computing a third signature component c using said first and second short term private keys t and k respectively, and sending said signature components (r, s, c) as a masked digital signature of said message m to a receiver computer system; in said receiver system;
(g) using said second and third signature components (s,c) computing a normal signature component s and sending said signature components (s, r) as a normal digital signature to a receiver verifer computer system; and in said verifier system (h) verifying said normal signature.
2. A method as defined in claim 1, said first short term private key k is an integer and said first short term public key is derived by computing the value kP =
(x1,y1) wherein P is a point of prime order n in E(Fq), wherein E is an elliptic curve defined over F q.
(x1,y1) wherein P is a point of prime order n in E(Fq), wherein E is an elliptic curve defined over F q.
3. A method as defined in claim 2, said first signature component r having a form defined by r = x(mod n) wherein x is derived by converting said coordinate x1 to an integer x.
4. A method as defined in claim 3, said second short term private key being an integer selected such that 2 ~ t ~ (n-2), and said second signature component being defined by s = t (e + dr)(mod n), wherein a is a hash of said message m.
5. A method as defined in claim 4, said third signature component being defined by c = tk(mod n).
6. A method as defined in claim 5, said normal signature component s being defined by s = c -1s mod n.
7. A method of generating a digital signature S of a message in a data communication system, wherein the signor of the message has a private key d and a public key y derived from an element g and said private key d, said method comprising the steps of:
(a) generating a short term private key k;
(b) computing a first short term public key derived from said short term private key k;
(c) computing a first signature component r by using said first short term public key k;
(d) generating a second short term private key t;
(e) computing a second signature component s by using said second short term private key t on said message m, said long term private key and first signature component r;
(f) computing a third signature component c using said first and second short term private keys t and k respectively;
(g) sending said signature components (r, s, c) as a masked digital signature of said message m to a receiver computer system.
(a) generating a short term private key k;
(b) computing a first short term public key derived from said short term private key k;
(c) computing a first signature component r by using said first short term public key k;
(d) generating a second short term private key t;
(e) computing a second signature component s by using said second short term private key t on said message m, said long term private key and first signature component r;
(f) computing a third signature component c using said first and second short term private keys t and k respectively;
(g) sending said signature components (r, s, c) as a masked digital signature of said message m to a receiver computer system.
8. A method as defined in claim 7 including the step of in said receiver computer system, using said second and third signature components (s, r) computing a normal signature component s , and sending said signature components (s, r) as a normal digital signature to a verifier computer system, and verifying said normal signature (s, r) by said verifier system.
9. A method as defined in claim 8 including the step of in said receiver system, using said second and third signature components (s, c) computing a normal signature component s, to derive a normal digital signature components (s, n) and;
verifying said normal signature components.
verifying said normal signature components.
10. A processing means for assigning a message m without performing inversion operations and including a long term private key contained within a secure boundary and a long term public key derived from said private key and a generator of predetermined order in a field, said processing means comprising:
within said secure boundary;
means for generating a first short term private key;
means for generating a second short teen private key;
means for generating a first signature component using at least said second short term session key; and generating a masked signature component using said first and second short term session keys to produce masked signature components of said message m.
within said secure boundary;
means for generating a first short term private key;
means for generating a second short teen private key;
means for generating a first signature component using at least said second short term session key; and generating a masked signature component using said first and second short term session keys to produce masked signature components of said message m.
11. A processing means as defined in claim 10, including means for converting said signature components to a normal signature component; and means for transmitting said normal signature components to a recipient.
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US08-966702 | 1997-11-10 | ||
US08/966,702 US6279110B1 (en) | 1997-11-10 | 1997-11-10 | Masked digital signatures |
PCT/CA1998/001040 WO1999025092A1 (en) | 1997-11-10 | 1998-11-10 | Masked digital signatures |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
CA2308170A1 true CA2308170A1 (en) | 1999-05-20 |
CA2308170C CA2308170C (en) | 2009-12-22 |
Family
ID=25511765
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
CA002308170A Expired - Lifetime CA2308170C (en) | 1997-11-10 | 1998-11-10 | Masked digital signatures |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (6) | US6279110B1 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1033009B1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP4649040B2 (en) |
AU (1) | AU1017599A (en) |
CA (1) | CA2308170C (en) |
WO (1) | WO1999025092A1 (en) |
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-
1997
- 1997-11-10 US US08/966,702 patent/US6279110B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
-
1998
- 1998-11-10 EP EP98952478A patent/EP1033009B1/en not_active Revoked
- 1998-11-10 AU AU10175/99A patent/AU1017599A/en not_active Abandoned
- 1998-11-10 WO PCT/CA1998/001040 patent/WO1999025092A1/en active Application Filing
- 1998-11-10 CA CA002308170A patent/CA2308170C/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1998-11-10 JP JP2000519973A patent/JP4649040B2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
-
2001
- 2001-02-02 US US09/773,665 patent/US7260723B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2007
- 2007-08-02 US US11/882,560 patent/US7552329B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2009
- 2009-06-22 US US12/488,652 patent/US7996676B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2011
- 2011-06-29 US US13/172,138 patent/US8359468B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2012
- 2012-12-28 US US13/730,440 patent/US8732467B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
JP4649040B2 (en) | 2011-03-09 |
US20080005570A1 (en) | 2008-01-03 |
US7260723B2 (en) | 2007-08-21 |
US7996676B2 (en) | 2011-08-09 |
JP2001523067A (en) | 2001-11-20 |
EP1033009A1 (en) | 2000-09-06 |
US20130145168A1 (en) | 2013-06-06 |
US8732467B2 (en) | 2014-05-20 |
WO1999025092A1 (en) | 1999-05-20 |
US8359468B2 (en) | 2013-01-22 |
CA2308170C (en) | 2009-12-22 |
US20090319790A1 (en) | 2009-12-24 |
US7552329B2 (en) | 2009-06-23 |
US6279110B1 (en) | 2001-08-21 |
US20010008013A1 (en) | 2001-07-12 |
EP1033009B1 (en) | 2013-01-16 |
US20110258455A1 (en) | 2011-10-20 |
AU1017599A (en) | 1999-05-31 |
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